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 Much scholarly attention has been devoted to the role of political parties in Congress.  
One of the major theories of party legislative organization is cartel theory.  Cartel theory 
assumes that each legislative party possesses a party record or reputation, which influences the 
election prospects for all members of the party.  It provides an electoral incentive to encourage 
cooperation among party members in a single chamber of Congress. 
 Congressional scholars have paid little attention to the party record.  In the following 
chapters, I bring together the desultory scholarly research on the party record and examine the 
impact of the party record on aggregate challenger entry, aggregate retirements, and seat change 
for the United States House of Representatives from 1970-2008.    
Two party record components, integrity and ideology, are taken from previous research 
on the party record.  I develop and test a third measure, aggregate party-level negative integrity, 
based on television evening news coverage of each party‘s scandals in the House.  
Using ordinary least squares regression, I find that two components of the party record, 
competence and integrity, influence aggregate challenger entry but not aggregate quality 
challenger entry.  The party record does not impact aggregate retirements.  However, in a logistic 
regression model of individual retirements of House members accused of scandal, I find that 
party leaders are successful at pressuring certain party members to resign or retire from the 
House. Moreover, in a negative binomial regression model of evening news stories attributable 
to each member‘s scandal, when party leaders are successful at forcing a member to quit, he or 
she generates less negative publicity for the party  Finally, using OLS regression, I find that the 
party record does not impact seat change in the House except in open seat races.  In open seat 
iv 
 
races, the ideological component of the party record positively impacts seat change. 
I conclude by describing the impact of these results on theories of legislative 
organization.  I then describe the impact of these results on democratic theory as it relates to 
collective responsible via responsible parties.        
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“[T]he political parties created democracy and […] modern democracy is unthinkable save 
in terms of political parties” (Schattschneider 1942, 1). 
For early party government theorists, such as E. E. Schattschneider, political parties were 
essential for the creation and operation of democracy.  Theories of party government emphasize 
the importance of distinct political parties, parties which offer voters meaningful party programs.  
An essential element of responsible party government is collective responsibility (Ranney 1954).  
Collective responsibility through parties means that party members are held accountable for the 
actions of their political party.  This concept seems to clash with modern conceptions of 
congressional behavior, which argue that members of Congress (MCs) act in their own self-
interest rather than on behalf of the interests of Congress as an institution or their political party.  
They build individual reputations for constituent service, they court constituent interests, and 
they strengthen their incumbency advantage (Mayhew 1974a; Fenno 1978).  It is their own 
electoral, institutional, and policy goals that are paramount, not those of Congress or their 
political party.  In such a context, how can MCs be held collectively responsible? The party 
record provides a possible answer.  The party record is a party's reputation in the electorate, a 
reputation that hurts or harms the electoral prospects of all party members.    
 This research seeks to determine if the party record provides the kind of collective 
responsibility advocated by responsible party government theorists.  It also addresses the 
following questions: Does the party record influence election outcomes? Does it impact the 
behavior of party members?  If these questions are answered in the affirmative, then the party 
record may provide the means through which to achieve collective responsibility.   
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 In this dissertation, I will do the following.  First, I will provide a thorough description of 
the party record and related concepts. Second, I devise and test a measure of integrity, a 
component of the party record.  Third, I address recent developments in the party record 
literature regarding the intra-chamber nature of the party record and challenger versus incumbent 
party records while also distinguishing the party record from national tides.  Fourth, I analyze 
the party record across three different election-related dependent variables—challenger entry, 
retirements, and election results. Finally, I will summarize the results of my research and 
describe the implications of my research for collective responsibility and responsible party 
government.     
 The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, partisan theories of legislative 
organization are discussed. Reviewing this literature will put the concept of the party record in a 
larger context.  Second, the concept of the party record is reviewed. Cox and McCubbins' (1993) 
initial formulation of the party record, as well as subsequent refinements, are summarized.  
Third, differences between the party record and national tides are discussed.  Both the party 
record and national tides could act as mechanisms through which party members may be held 
collectively accountable. These two concepts, however, are quite different, and it is important to 
draw distinctions between them.  Fourth, a chapter-by-chapter summary for evaluating the party 
record is given.  Last, the importance of party record research for political science is discussed.  
 
Party Government Theories of Legislative Organization 
Positive party government theorists have produced two major theories of Congressional 
organization—conditional party government and cartel theory. 
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Conditional Party Government 
Under conditional party government (CPG), party leaders are granted greater power by party 
members under two conditions—intraparty homogeneity and interparty heterogeneity of policy 
preferences. Intraparty homogeneity means that members of a political party in Congress have 
similar policy preferences. Interparty heterogeneity of preferences means that the members of 
the Democratic Party have policy preferences that are substantially different from members of 
the Republican Party.  The obvious implication here is that the power of parties and their leaders 
varies depending on the policy preferences of those in Congress.  
 Prior to the late 1980s, scholars had largely dismissed parties as weak and irrelevant, 
leaving Fiorina (1980) to lament that there had been a decline in collective responsibility, 
ultimately leading to government inaction.  CPG theorists, particularly Rohde (1991), might 
argue that Fiorina had witnessed a period during which parties were not powerful because the 
two conditions for CPG had not been met.  This period, according to Rohde (1991), was 
characterized by intraparty heterogeneity.  Southern Democrats often aligned themselves with 
Republicans to block the efforts of liberal Democrats to pass legislation.  Furthermore, the 
Northeast saw its share of liberal Republicans, who crossed party lines to support Democratic 
legislation, decline.  As the solidly Democratic South began to vote Republican, conservative 
Southern Democrats were replaced by conservative Republicans.  As a result, parties became 
more ideologically homogenous.  During this period of time, House and party caucus rules were 
changed to strengthen political parties and their leaders.  These changes included the elimination 
of seniority as the sole basis for ascension to committee chairmanships, greater involvement of 
the leadership in committee assignments, and a strengthening of the Rules Committee, among 
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others (Rohde 1974; 1991; Cox and McCubbins 2005).  With the change in policy preferences of 
members of both the Democratic Caucus and the Republican Conference, House and caucus 
rules were altered to strengthen political parties. 
 
Cartel Theory 
In contrast to CPG, cartel theory focuses on the electoral goal of legislators (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993; 2005; Smith 2000). CPG touches on the electoral goal by tying legislators' 
preferences to constituency interests (Aldrich and Rohde 2001), but cartel theory places even 
greater emphasis on the electoral goal.  The goals of political parties, according to cartel theory, 
include control of agenda powers, making good public policy, improving the party record, 
reelecting party members to the House, gaining or maintaining a majority, and reelecting party 
leaders to their positions (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 8).  To achieve these goals, the majority 
party operates as a cartel, monopolizing House resources, such as committee assignments and 
chairmanships, staff, and the plenary schedule (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Moreover, party 
leaders are given additional powers to pursue their goals.    
 More recently, Cox and McCubbins (2005) have updated cartel theory to focus on 
negative agenda setting.  Negative agenda setting refers to the ability of the majority party to 
keep unwanted legislation from passage.  The majority party entrusts its party and committee 
leaders to use their powers to keep the majority party from being rolled by the minority.  
Committee and party leaders must ensure that legislation opposed by a majority of the majority 
party does not pass the House. Cox and McCubbins would probably respond differently than 
Rohde to Fiorina's observation about the weakening of political parties and a decline in 
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collective responsibility.  They might argue that Fiorina is describing an era in which parties are 
still powerful. Parties utilize their negative agenda powers to keep from being rolled; however, 
Cox and McCubbins would probably concede that the positive agenda powers of the majority 
during this period are substantially less than in previous eras, while negative agenda powers are 
greater.  Under CPG, parties are powerful when they meet the conditions of interparty 
heterogeneity and intraparty homogeneity. Under cartel theory, party strength is relatively 
constant, but some periods are dominated by negative agenda setting while others are known for 
positive agenda setting.    
   According to Cox and McCubbins (2005), cartel theory and CPG are compatible with 
one another.  Indeed, both theories claim that the majority party attempts to steer policies away 
from the floor median and toward the median of the majority party.  Cartel theory is focused on 
negative agenda setting while CPG focuses on positive agenda setting.  Cartel theory places a 
greater emphasis on structure—how is the House structured to keep the majority from being 
rolled? Why are committees stacked with majority party members?  CPG theorists, on the other 
hand, focus on how carrots and sticks from party leaders aid in the passage of legislation.   Put 
another way, cartel theory offers an explanation of negative agenda setting while CPG focuses 
positive agenda setting.   
 
The Party Record 
A key component of cartel theory is the party record.  Indeed, Cox and McCubbins (1993) state 
that cartel theory is impossible without the party record.  The party record is the reputation of the 
party in the electorate. This reputation is earned by the actions of Congressional parties and their 
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members. Passing meaningful legislation, for example, should positively impact the record, 
while scandal should harm the party record.  The party record ties together the electoral success 
or failure of party members.  As Cox and McCubbins (1993, 112) put it, ―substantial components 
of the party record affect all its members similarly: for example, all are hurt by scandal or helped 
by perceptions of competence, honesty,  and integrity; all or nearly all are helped by the party's 
platform, when taken as a whole.‖  One of the key questions for normative responsible party 
government theorists is how to encourage party members to stay loyal to the party (Committee 
on Parties 1950).  The party record, through its electoral consequences, provides an incentive for 
party members to work together.  
  Formally, Cox and McCubbins (1993, 110) express the probability of reelection as:      
Function 1.1: Ri = Ri(ci; pi) 
where Ri = probability of reelection 
ci = personal characteristics 
pi = party characteristics 
Thus, the probability of reelection is a function of both the personal characteristics of 
incumbents as well as their party's characteristics.  Personal characteristics include personal 
qualities, incumbent reputations, and incumbency advantage more generally.  Party 
characteristics include party beliefs, such as party identification, and the party record.  The party 
record accounts for only a portion of the probability of reelection related to party characteristics.   
In characterizing the probability of reelection in this way, Cox and McCubbins (1993) have 
identified a mechanism which allows room for both collective responsibility (through the part of 




Evaluating the existence and impact of the party record has been difficult.  Cox and McCubbins 
(1993) have examined interelection partisan swings to determine the existence of party records.  
They find that House elections tend to favor one party over the other.  Also, average party swing 
is a strong predictor of the probability that an incumbent will win reelection.  Jones and 
McDermott (2004) examine exit polling data from the 1990, 1994, and 1998 midterm elections 
and find that those who approve of the performance of Congress are more likely to vote for the 
majority party in the House and the Senate.  From this finding, they conclude that legislative 
parties may be held responsible to the electorate apart from their relationship with the President.  
The vehicle which allows voters to make this distinction is the party record.  Jones and 
McDermott‘s analysis falls short in several areas, however.  First, the party record, as Cox and 
McCubbins define it, is an intra-chamber phenomenon.  Approval of Congress is a reflection of 
both the House and Senate, so using it as proxy for the party record is problematic because it is 
an inter-chamber measure. Such a measure is especially difficult to use when there is a divided 
Congress with Democrats controlling one chamber while Republicans control the other.  Second, 
Jones and McDermott (2004) only examine midterm elections, but the party record operates in 
all elections, even if presidential candidates are on the ballot.  It is possible that the effect of the 
party record may be overwhelmed by other factors during some presidential contests, but there is 
still a party record during those elections.  Third, their analysis fails to address minority party 
records.  While Cox and McCubbins (1993) primarily discuss the role of the majority party in 
the House, minority parties also have party records, and these party records are not addressed by 
Jones and McDermott.      
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Taking a different approach, Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007) offer a theory of 
strategic party government which blends elements of both CPG and cartel theory into one 
theoretical framework.  In contrast to Jones and McDermott (2004), Lebo et al use a measure of 
the party record which is generated by a political party in one chamber of Congress. They find 
that Democratic legislative victories on the floor of the House increase the number of seats 
Democrats pick up each election cycle, offering additional evidence for the existence of the party 
record. Woon and Pope's (2008) examination of the party record finds that ideological labels 
help explain the election results of MCs.  According to cartel theory, only incumbents should 
receive an electoral benefit from the activities of their parties; however, Woon and Pope find that 
ideological party labels also aid the election prospects of challengers.  Finally, Lebo and O'Geen 
(2011) find that the success of the President at winning support from his party in the House 
(competence) seems to matter more for House reelection results than the actions of MCs.   
 Taken together, these four articles and one book chapter (to my knowledge, these five 
studies constitute the entire body of party record research) scratch the surface of the party record 
but leave several unanswered questions.  These studies do not address a key component of the 
party record, integrity, mentioned in previous research (Cox and McCubbins 1993).  They do not 
adequately examine the impact of these components on election results or other election-related 
phenomena.  Specifically, they have not examined the combined impact of ideology, 
competence, and integrity on incumbent retirement decisions, challenger entry decisions, or 
election results.  Finally, they do not explain in great detail how the party record differs from 
national tides.  The research undertaken in the following chapters examines these deficits in the 
literature, each of which is discussed in more depth along the way.  
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National Tides and the Party Record 
Before proceeding with the examination of the party record, key distinctions must be made 
between the party record and national tides.  In their formal representation of reelection 
probability, Cox and McCubbins do not distinguish between the effect of the party record and 
national tides, but a distinction should be made.  Formally, p (party characteristics) is comprised 
of the impact of national tides (n) and the party record (r), so Ri=Ri (ci; ni, ri).  Models of both 
national tides and the party record predict that elections tend to favor one party over the other; 
however, the concept of the party record differs from national tides in several respects.  First, 
national tides presumably affect offices beyond the House of Representatives and the Senate. A 
national tide may impact presidential elections, elections for Senate, and state and local 
elections.  In contrast, the party record should primarily impact House and Senate elections.  
This difference is made apparent by the standard use of two independent variables in the analysis 
of national tides: presidential approval and economic conditions.  Presidential approval is a 
standard measure for overall political conditions.  Overall political conditions within the country 
are not related to just one chamber of Congress.  Economic conditions also have consequences 
for a wide range of political offices.  Factors that impact the party record, on the other hand, 
should mostly impact one legislative chamber.  That is not to say that the party record does not 
have spillover effects that influence other races.  The actions of parties in the House can have 
implications for national political conditions.  For instance, passage of economic legislation 
should have some sort of effect on the economy, which should influence national tides.  Also, it 
is possible that the party record influences party committee fundraising, which could bolster or 
hamper the turnout efforts of national and state party organizations.  The impact on these 
10 
 
organizations and their activities could also be reflected in down ballot races.  This research, 
though, is primarily interested in isolating the impact of the benefits and costs of the party record 
on its intended recipients, MCs.  While the party record can have an impact beyond the chamber 
which generated it, party record research suggests that the main thrust of the party record, its 
primary effect, is reserved for the party members who are responsible for creating it.     
 The chamber-specific nature of the party record is not stated explicitly by Cox and 
McCubbins.  They merely show that House elections tend to favor one party over another.  
Taken as a whole, however, Cox and McCubbins' work suggests that the party record is chamber 
specific. It is determined by the actions of political parties in each chamber of Congress and 
should primarily impact only those in the chamber who generated it.   Lebo, McGlynn, and 
Koger's (2007) research also suggests that party records are chamber specific through their use 
of independent variables that are chamber specific in their analysis, such as Democratic win rate 
on the floor of the House.  Recently, however, Lebo and O'Geen (2011) have challenged the 
notion that the party record is an intra-chamber phenomenon.  Instead, they assert that the 
legislative success of the President actually plays a larger role in determining the electoral fate of 
his party in the House than does House legislative success.  Their analysis is limited to just one 
component of the party record, competence, and needs further refinements.  
 Second, regarding the party record, political parties are, in part, able to determine their 
own electoral fates.  Scandals and bills passed are two chamber specific factors that are 
influenced by the actions of parties and their leaders.  In contrast to these party record variables, 
the two major independent variables included in the analysis of national tides are beyond the 
domain of just one chamber of Congress, suggesting that parties in Congress have little control 
11 
 
over national tides.  Ultimately, Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger's analysis, taken together with the 
work of Cox and McCubbins, suggest that parties in the House may help determine the electoral 
fortunes of their members through the party record.  In other words, the actions of parties and 
their members in the House actually matter for the election outcomes of all members.   
Economic conditions and presidential approval do not meet this description.  National tides, 
then, seem to be an inter-branch phenomenon whereas party records are primarily intra-chamber 
(although this proposition is thrown into doubt by Lebo and O'Geen (2011)). 
 Third, studies focused on the party record have interpreted it through the lens of the 
incumbent House member (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007; Lebo 
and O'Geen 2011).  National tides, on the other hand, take into account the actions of challengers 
as well as incumbents.  For instance, Jacobson and Kernell's (1983) strategic politicians 
hypothesis states that quality challengers are more likely to run against an incumbent if national 
political conditions provide an advantage for their candidacy.  Jacobson and Kernell (1983) and 
Jacobson (1989) focus heavily on the role of challengers; whereas, the party record has been 
characterized as an incumbent phenomenon. The studies reviewed here, save Woon and Pope 
(2008) suggest that the party record, as constructed by Cox and McCubbins, should only benefit 
incumbents, not challengers; whereas, national tides can help or hurt both challengers and 
incumbents.     
 
Components of the Party Record: Competence, Integrity, and Ideology 
Cox and McCubbins (1993) note that all party members are affected equally by party reputations 
for competence and integrity.  With the exception of this blurb from Cox and McCubbins, party 
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record research has been largely silent on the different dimensions of the party record.  Woon 
and Pope (2008) focused exclusively on ideological reputations while Lebo, McGlynn, and 
Koger (2007) tacitly focused on the competence component of the party record.  This research 
draws attention to the two dimensions identified by Cox and McCubbins as affecting all party 
members in legislative chamber, competence and integrity, as well as a third component, 
ideology, identified by Woon and Pope.  
 Although the party record literature has not focused a great deal on these components, the 
literature on individual incumbent reputations has paid greater attention to competence and 
integrity.  Previous work has found that incumbents attempt to build positive reputations to 
strengthen incumbency advantage.  Mayhew (1974a, 49-50) suggests that House members 
engage in three basic activities to help their reelection prospects: advertising, credit claiming, 
and position taking.  With advertising, members of Congress seek to build favorable images or 
brand names for themselves among their constituents.  MCs emphasize certain positive qualities 
to foster positive reputations with their constituents.  Fenno (1978, 55-58) discusses a similar 
activity, which he calls ―presentation of self.‖  With presentation of self, House members try to 
manipulate the perceptions that constituents have of them.  MCs seek to build the trust of 
constituents in order to win their votes.  One way MCs may work towards that end is by touting 
their qualifications for holding office. There are two components of qualifications--competence 
and honesty. Competence refers to a MC's ability to perform the job.  Legislators are assumed to 
be honest unless constituents are given reason to question their honesty.  While Mayhew and 




 Later scholars have elaborated on the findings of Mayhew and Fenno. Mann and 
Wolfinger (1980, 622) find that incumbent legislators generally enjoy positive reputations 
among their constituents.  In comparison to their assessments of challengers, constituents have 
high regard for their incumbent MC.  Mann and Wolfinger (1980, 624) conclude that ―[v]oters 
appear to judge candidates, and incumbents in particular, on the basis of their perceived 
character, experience, and ties to the local community.‖  Others have examined the quality of 
incumbents by looking at the reputations of legislators along two dimensions—competence and 
integrity--finding that integrity, or lack thereof, affects feeling thermometer scores, vote choice, 
and challenger contacts to voters (McCurley and Mondak 1995; Mondak 1995).  Moreover, a 
poor reputation for integrity decreases vote margin in general elections and in primary elections 
and decreases the probability of running unopposed in primary elections.    
 Just as individual legislators attempt to build positive reputations for competence and 
integrity, party record theorists suggest that parties in Congress build party records designed to 
bolster the election prospects of their members.  
 
Examining the Party Record 
The next three chapters address four questions that remain unanswered by current party record 
research.  First, how do national tides and the party record differ?  How are they the same? 
Second, what is the impact of the integrity component of the party record? Third, is the party 
record an intra-chamber phenomenon?  Finally, in what ways does the party record influence 
Congressional elections?   These questions are answered at three different steps in Congressional 
elections--challenger entry, retirements, and general election results.   
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 In Chapter 2, the differences and similarities between national tides and the party record 
are fleshed out in greater detail and assessed empirically.  How similar or different are the party 
record and national tides? In contrast to previous research, three dimensions of the party record 
are used in the analysis of the party record: ideology, competence, and integrity.  For integrity, 
scandals in the House are identified for each Congress from 1969-2008 and a measure of 
negative integrity is created by examining scandal-related evening news stories for both 
Democrats and Republicans.  The second component is competence.  Lebo, McGlynn, and 
Koger (2007) and Lebo and O'Geen (2011) use Democratic win rate on the floor as a 
reputational measure, and it is used as a measure of competence in this study.  The third 
component of party record is ideology. Woon and Pope (2008) suggest that ideological 
reputations are important for each party's record.   Ideological labels provide cues to voters about 
the types of policies that a particular party will pursue.  The more ideologically homogenous the 
party is, the stronger the cue.  Polarization between parties also makes ideological reputations 
clearer.  A measure of polarization is also included in the models.  Woon and Pope's (2008) 
model of ideological reputations and election results does not include a measure of competence 
(Democratic or Republican Win Rate), which may be correlated with ideological homogeneity.  
Under Conditional Party Government, intraparty ideological homogeneity leads to an increase in 
the powers of party leaders to pass legislation, so it is expected that ideological homogeneity and 
Democratic Win Rate are correlated, which may diminish some of the impact of Woon and 
Pope's ideological component of the party record.  
 National tide research suggests that national political conditions (presidential approval 
and the economy) influence challenger entry decisions.  Party record research, on the other hand, 
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suggests that only incumbents receive benefits from the party record.  Woon and Pope (2008), 
however, dispute this assertion; they find that challengers receive an electoral benefit from 
ideological party reputations.  Chapter 2 seeks to add to this debate by evaluating aggregate 
challenger entry. 
 In Chapter 3, voluntary departures from the House of Representatives are examined.  In 
the first part of the chapter, aggregate House retirements are examined.  The three components of 
the party record described in Chapter 2 are used to test the impact of the party record on 
retirements.  Previous research has not evaluated the impact of the party record on retirements.  I 
hypothesize that aggregate retirements will increase when the party record is bad and will 
decrease when it is good.   I also examine the individual retirements of members of the House 
accused of scandal.  Party leaders may pressure members of their own party to resign or retire 
from the House if a scandal is particularly serious and may cause grave harm to the party record. 
 In Chapter 4, the electoral consequences of the party record are analyzed.  Three 
dependent variables are used—seat change, open seat win rate, and contested seat win rate.   An 
analysis of seat change shows the overall picture of how party records influence election results.  
An analysis of open seat win rate provides another opportunity to examine whether the each 
party‘s record influences the electoral fortunes of non-incumbents.  A bad party record with low 
ideological homogeneity, low ideological polarization between parties, poor competence, and/or 
poor integrity, should be associated with a decrease in the probability of incumbent reelection 
and decrease in the percentage of the two-party vote won by that incumbent.  Lebo, McGlynn, 
and Koger (2007) and Lebo and O'Geen (2011) examine the competence dimension of the party 
record on seat change (aggregate election results) while Woon and Pope analyze ideological 
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reputations, but integrity has not been included in previous research.  If no effects are found for 
incumbent reelection, then it is possible that Cox and McCubbins' party record does not provide 
the kind of mechanism needed for responsible party government.  Lebo and O'Geen (2011) argue 
that the actions of the President impact the party record, not the actions of Congress, but they 
have only investigated the competence component of the party record.   
 The impact of the party record on aggregate challenger entry, retirements, and seat 
change is conducted for 1970-2008 elections.  Because data are unavailable for the integrity 
variable before 1969, I limit the analysis to this time period.  To evaluate the impact of the party 
record on challenger entry, retirements, and seat change, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
time-series regression.   Additionally, I also examine the individual retirement decisions of 
House members accused of scandal from 1970-2008 using Logistic regression, and I employ 
Negative Binomial regression for the analysis of evening news stories attributed to each scandal.     
 In Chapter 5, I conclude by summarizing the results from quantitative analysis of the 
party record and discussing the implications of those findings for positive Congressional 
organization theory and responsible party government theories.  For positive Congressional 
organization theory, I describe the empirical findings of this research in the broader context of 
the debate on Congressional organization.  That is, do parties have a significant impact on 
Congressional organization?  Or is a nonpartisan theory of Congressional organization a better 
fit for the results found in this research?  Additionally, the conclusions reached here will be put 
in the context of normative responsible government theories.  The major question to be 
addressed is, can the party record provide the mechanism called for in normative theory to 
provide collective responsibility through political parties?  In answering this question, I 
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distinguish between two types of partisan collective responsibility, coalitional and institutional.  
 
Contributions to Congressional Research  
The research undertaken here makes several contributions to the literature on Congress.  First, 
the party record is explained and examined thoroughly.  Previous research on the party record 
has scratched the surface of this concept but has not delved as deeply as is required for a concept 
that is the cornerstone for a major theory of Congressional organization.  Second, by delving 
more deeply into the party record, I distinguish it from national tides.  While I was presenting at 
a panel for the Southern Political Science Association in Atlanta in 2010, the discussant for the 
panel found it difficult to distinguish between the party record and national tides.  In this chapter, 
I have drawn distinctions between each concept, and in the following chapters, I find support for 
many of these distinctions. Third, I model three components of the party record in the same 
statistical models and examine one component, integrity, which has not been analyzed in 
previous research.  Previous research has included models with either a competence or 
ideological component (Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007;  Lebo and O'Geen 2011; Woon and 
Pope 2008). Fourth, I test the intra-chamber assumption of the party record across all three 
components of the party record.  Fifth, I devise and test measures of negative integrity together 
with party record measures found in previous research.  Cox and McCubbins (1993) note the 
importance of integrity as a component of the party record, yet no measures have been created 
and tested.  I address this void in the literature.  Finally, I model the party record across a wide 
range of election-related phenomena from challenger quality to retirements, both of which have 




In the introduction to this dissertation, I have related a key component of normative party 
government theory, collective responsibility, to a component of positive party government 
theory, the party record.  The party record should act as a mechanism through which collective 
responsibility can be achieved.  Additionally, I have provided a thorough account of the party 
record, reviewed the previous literature on the subject, placed it in the larger context of positive 
party government theories, distinguished party records from national tides, discussed three key 
components of party record, and provided plans for empirically examining the party record. 
 Results from a thorough study of the party record may yield several important 
contributions to political science.  First, if the analysis presented here finds that party elections 
affect congressional behavior and election outcomes, then it will provide empirical support for a 
critical component of cartel theory, adding to the ongoing debate about the role of political 
parties in legislative organization.  On the other hand, if the analysis finds no support for the 
party record, then alternative nonpartisan theories of legislative organization may be bolstered.  
Second, further research on the party record could help democratic theorists better understand 
the mechanisms by which party members are held collectively responsible.  Normative 
responsible government theory assumes that party members are held collectively responsible for 
the policies and actions of their political parties.  The mechanism, through which this occurs, 
party labels, is implicit in the literature.  Further research on party reputations could provide 
normative theorists with a more accurate description of how collective responsibility works.  
Third, further research on party records could answer an important, yet often neglected, 
question, does Congress control its own electoral fate?  National tide research focuses on factors 
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beyond the exclusive control of members of Congress. Beyond the traditional activities 
undertaken to build incumbency advantage, the party record provides members of Congress with 




Chapter 2: The Party Record and Challenger Entry 
 
In September 2006, ABC News reported that Republican Representative Mark Foley (R-FL) had 
sent sexually suggestive e-mails to male teens working in the House of Representatives' page 
program.  Over the next few weeks, more shocking allegations came to light regarding the 
Congressman's interactions with male pages.  He sent sexually-charged instant messages to male 
pages and actually engaged in sexual activities with two former pages. The plot thickened when 
the public learned that the Republican leadership in the House knew about Foley's e-mail 
exchanges with a page from Louisiana and yet failed to act (Zeleny 2006a; 2006b).  Shortly after 
the scandal came to light, Representative Foley resigned his seat in the House.  The Foley-page 
scandal only added additional ammunition to charges made by Congressional Democrats that the 
Republicans were fostering a ―culture of corruption‖ in both chambers of Congress. Several 
Democrats challenging vulnerable incumbent House Republicans attempted to make the case 
that their Republican opponents were tied to the Mark Foley scandal through their party (Hulse 
and Zeleny 2006).  Democratic challengers had pounced on the opportunity to link Republican 
incumbents to the ethics' woes of their party.  
 Democratic incumbents have also received their share of attacks from Republican 
challengers based on the actions of a Democratic colleague. Representative Charlie Rangel (D-
NY) ascended to the chairmanship of the House Ways and Means Committee in 2007.  Shortly 
into his term as chairman, allegations of unethical behavior surfaced.  In 2008, Rangel was 
accused of using House letterhead to solicit donations from corporations for the Charles Rangel 
Center for Public Service at City College of New York.  More serious accusations of wrongdoing  
surfaced in 2008, Rangel was accused of paying rent below market value for several apartments, 
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receiving free parking, and failing to report assets as taxable income.  In 2009, the National 
Legal Policy Center filed a complaint against Rangel for taking junkets to the Caribbean paid for 
by a nonprofit in violation of House rules.  Rangel's ethics troubles led him to resign his post as 
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and more recently, he was censured by the 
House.  Republican challengers jumped at the chance to link Democratic incumbents to Rangel's 
ethics' troubles.  In upstate New York, for example, Republican challenger Richard Hanna 
attacked incumbent Rep. Mark Arcuri for his ties to Rangel.  Eventually, Arcuri gave to charity 
$23,000 in campaign contributions that he had received from Rangel.  Arcuri later urged Rangel 
to resign from the House (Scott 2010).  
 In both of these cases, challengers used party links to attack their opponents.  Challengers 
play an important role in electoral politics.  They can point out flaws in incumbents that may not 
receive attention otherwise.  They can also call greater attention to the actions of an incumbent's 
political party, as illustrated by the cases of Foley and Rangel.  In both of these cases, challengers 
believed that incumbents were vulnerable because of their political parties' ties to unethical 
individuals.  These individuals gave challengers campaign ammunition to fire at their incumbent 
opponents.  The only real tie between some incumbents and these ethically-challenged 
individuals was through their political party.  Each of these scandals seem to hurt the Democrats‘ 
(Rangel) or Republicans‘ (Foley) reputations.   
 This chapter discusses challenger entry as it relates to the party record, a party's 
reputation in the electorate.  The party record is nested within a larger theoretical framework that 
seeks to explain how chambers in Congress organize themselves, a framework known as cartel 
theory.  According to Cox and McCubbins (1993), without the party record, cartel theory cannot 
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exist. The party record provides an electoral incentive for members of the same political party to 
work together to solve collective action problems and organize themselves in such a way as to 
foster a positive party record to aid the reelection of its members.  In this chapter, I study the 
relationship between aggregate challenger entry and the party record.  Also, I propose and test a 
measure of the integrity component of the party record. Finally, I investigate discrepancies in the 
party record literature concerning the impact of party records on challenger entry  
 
Challenger Entry 
Two broad sets of factors influence the decision of potential challengers to run for the House or 
not—the incumbency advantage and district effects and national political conditions. 
 Incumbents seek to exert influence over potential and actual challengers.  They engage in 
a variety of activities to discourage challenger entry (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974a), especially 
the entry of quality challengers.  In general, incumbents seek to strengthen their electoral 
advantage over challengers to discourage serious candidates from running against them in the 
next election.  Put another way, they try to grow the size of their incumbency advantage.   There 
are many resources available to incumbents that give them an electoral advantage.  Incumbent 
activities which help  incumbents discourage potential challengers include raising exorbitant 
sums of money for their campaign coffers (Epstein and Zemsky 1995; though see Goodliffe 
2001),  spending money in less competitive elections (Goldstein et al. 1986; though see Krasno 
and Greene 1988), aligning their issue positions with those of their district, securing pork barrel 
spending projects for their districts, using the franking privilege to send mail to constituents 
(Mayhew 1974b), and taking care of the needs of their district's citizens through case work 
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(Fiorina 1977; King 1991; Mayhew 1974b).  As a result of these activities, incumbents typically 
enjoy higher name recognition than challengers and are generally well-liked by their constituents 
(Mann and Wolfinger 1980).  While many constituents may dislike Congress as an institution, 
they usually have high regard for their incumbent House member (Fenno 1975).  
When incumbents are weak (they may not have sufficiently engaged in the 
aforementioned activities regarding fundraising and carefully taking positions on issues that are 
in line with their constituency), challenges in the next election become more likely.  In Mondak's 
(1995) study of incumbent quality, he finds that lower quality incumbents are more likely to face 
a challenger in the next election.  He examines quality across two dimensions--competence and 
integrity (two of the same dimensions examined at the party level in this paper).  He also finds 
that challengers spend more against low quality level incumbents.  The geographical location of 
a district also appears to be an important explanatory variable; incumbents in the one-party South 
are less likely to face challengers than other regions of the country (Goodliffe 2001).  Because 
potential challengers from the other party viewed the seat as unwinnable, they generally opted 
not to run against the incumbent.  The perception that an incumbent is weak or vulnerable may 
increase the probability that he or she will face a challenger in the next election because potential 
challengers may think that they can beat him or her in the general election. Research indicates 
that the most important factor that influences the decision to run is whether the potential 
challenger thinks that he or she can win the general election (Maisel and Stone 1997).  
 In addition to individual and district-level characteristics that influence challenger entry,  
when national political conditions go against the incumbent's political party, he or she may be 
more likely to face a challenger in the next general election (Jacobson and Kernell 1983).  
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National tides also influence the perception that a potential challenger can beat an incumbent.  
When national political conditions and the economy favor the challenger‘s party, he or she is 
more likely to run against the incumbent.  Bianco (1984) finds that Watergate increased the 
propensity of Democrats to challenge Republican incumbents.  
Not all challengers are the same--some are of a higher quality than others.  Usually 
political scientists classify challengers who have held an elected office previously as being 
higher quality (Jacobson 1989).  These candidates have experience with raising money, 
campaigning, and in general being in the public eye.  Others have advanced different measures of 
quality, taking into account characteristics such as celebrity status and occupation (Krasno and 
Green 1988).  Jacobson finds that national political conditions influence the entry decisions of 
potential quality challengers.   In 2006, for instance, President George W. Bush was plagued by 
low approval ratings as a result of the war in Iraq.  House Democrats were able to field a decent 
number of high quality challengers to capitalize on political conditions that worked against 
incumbent Republicans (Jacobson 2007).  Similarly, in 2008, Bush‘s low approval rating, this 
time stemming from poor economic conditions, helped House Democrats field many high quality 
challengers against incumbent Republicans (Jacobson 2009).  
 Political scientists focus on challenger quality because higher quality challengers tend to 
be more successful than lower quality challengers in Congressional elections.  Most analyses of 
challenger quality distinguish between higher and lower quality challengers based on whether or 
not the challenger has held elected office previously (Jacobson 1989). Those who have held 
elected office are considered higher quality challengers than those who have not. They are better 
able to raise money, wage effective attacks against incumbents, and run a campaign.  High 
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quality challengers have the skill and resources to point out the shortcomings of incumbents 
(Jacobson 1990).  Under the strategic politician model, quality challengers will enter a race when 
they have a chance to win.  Usually, this means that the incumbent is weak or national political 
conditions favor the potential challenger's party or both (Jacobson and Kernell 1983).  A national 
political environment in which the President enjoys high approval ratings and the economy is in 
relatively good health may dissuade potential quality challengers who do not share the 
President‘s party label from running against an incumbent.  When national conditions do not 
favor one party over another, then potential quality challengers are likely to sit the election out.  
During the 1998 election season, for example, President Bill Clinton faced impeachment charges 
and uncertain potential Democratic challengers decided to forego the election.  Likewise, 
potential Republican challengers were uncertain about the impact of impeachment on the 
election, especially given strong economic growth and Clinton‘s extraordinarily high 66% 
approval rating (Jacobson 1999).  
Incumbents do not wish to face quality challengers. Quality challengers are more 
successful at unseating incumbents than less experienced, amateur candidates.  Jacobson and 
Kernell (1990) point to the low number of high quality Democratic challengers as one reason 
why House Republicans lost few seats in the 1986 midterm election, an election in which 
President Reagan‘s party was expected to suffer losses as part of the quadrennial midterm loss. In 
the 2002 midterm elections in which House Republicans defied the midterm loss, Jacobson 
(2003) notes that the quality of Democratic challengers was the weakest it had been since 1990.  
President Bush‘s extraordinarily high, post-September 11 approval ratings played a role in 
discouraging high quality Democratic challengers from going up against House Republican 
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incumbents.  Bianco (1984) tests Jacobson and Kernell's strategic politician hypothesis at the 
district-level and finds that economic conditions, incumbent performance in the last election, and 
district partisanship impact quality challenger decisions.    
Bianco's analysis as well as most other analyses of challenger entry decisions, especially 
those related to challenger quality, assume that all office holders are progressively ambitious 
(Black 1972; Rohde 1979).  Stone and Maisel (1997) find that potential challengers who 
currently hold office are more likely to think about running for the House than those who are not 
office holders. Maestas et al (2006) model challenger entry decisions separately from progressive 
ambition.   Examining state legislator decisions to run for the US House, they model progressive 
ambition as preceding the decision to run for Congress or not.  The decision to run for higher 
office is conditional on having progressive ambition.  Factors such as age, sex, family, and the 
institution in which the officeholder currently serves impact progressive ambition, while at the 
second stage of the model, factors related to the current election year and the probability of 
winning a House seat influence the decision to run for the House, provided that the state 
legislator possesses progressive ambition.       
 It should be noted that potential candidates decide to run or not to run for a variety of 
reasons, not just whether or not they can win.  Major life changes, political efficacy, and family 
all influence the decision to run for political office or sit on the sidelines (Fox and Lawless 2011) 
although whether a candidate can win seems to be the most important determinant of challenger 
entry decisions (Maisel and Stone 1997).  Research on nascent political ambition has 
demonstrated the importance of factors which lie outside the traditional rational choice strategic 
politician model.   While the approach taken in this chapter is rooted in the traditional, strategic 
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model, it is important to mention the limitations of such an approach.    
 
The Party Record, Its Components, and Challengers 
The party record is a party's reputation in the electorate. It is determined by the actions of 
political parties in Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005).  Party records exist for both 
parties in both chambers of Congress.  A good party record helps party members win reelection, 
whereas, a poor party record can hurt the reelection prospects of its members.  Parties are 
interested in securing the reelection of their members in order to gain or maintain majority status, 
and party leaders are entrusted with fostering a positive party record, one that helps rather than 
hurts the party's members win reelection (Cox and McCubbins 2005).  The party record contains 
three major components--ideology, competence, and integrity.  Parties that are able to pass 
legislation and deal with the policy problems facing the country are viewed as competent. A poor 
reputation for competence should also be associated with a decrease in the probability that party 
members will be reelected.  For instance, President Harry Truman described the 80th Congress as 
a "do-nothing Congress."  The Republicans held majorities in both chambers of Congress and 
opposed many of the legislative proposals offered by Truman.  Subsequently, the Republicans 
lost control of both chambers of Congress in the 1948 election.  In 2006, Democrats in the House 
leveled similar criticisms against the Republican-controlled 109th Congress.  They claimed that, 
despite having control of both chambers of Congress and the Presidency, the Republicans failed 
to pass important legislation to deal with the problems facing the country.  Much like the 1948 
election, Democrats picked up enough seats in both the House and Senate to take control of each 
chamber.  Parties whose members engage in scandalous behavior will have poor reputations for 
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integrity.  For instance, several Democratic House members were implicated in ABSCAM, a 
sting operation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in which an undercover agent 
offered money to officeholders in exchange for help with immigration matters.  This primarily 
Democratic scandal should hurt the Democratic Party's record and make it more difficult for its 
members to be reelected to office. .  
 In addition to competence and integrity, the ideological reputation of each party is an 
important component of the party record.  Recent Congressional scholarship has addressed the 
importance of ideological extremity in congressional elections.  Pertaining to both ideological 
extremity and partisanship, members of Congress pay great attention to the preferences of their 
constituents when making roll call decisions (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Bartels 
1991; Canes-Wrone and Cogan 2002).  Scholars have found that support for one's party or party 
unity also matters (Canes-Wrone, Brady, Cogan 2002).   Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007) have 
examined the relationship between party unity and seat change at the aggregate level, finding 
that increases in Democratic party unity decrease the number of seats held by Democrats in the 
House. Carson et al (2010) examine both party unity and ideological extremity at the district 
level and find that only party unity has a negative impact on reelection results, ceteris paribus.  
Much of the research in this area has focused on ideological extremity, finding that ideologically 
extreme or out-of-step candidates are less likely to be reelected (Erickson 1971).  Woon and Pope 
(2008) have found that party ideological labels provide an important informational shortcut to 
voters in Congressional elections when parties are more ideologically homogenous and more 
polarized.  Their efforts are different from previous attempts to examine ideological shortcuts 
because they claim that there is an institutional foundation to these reputational shortcuts.  
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Additionally, they do not include variables for ideological extremity, per se. Rather their 
polarization variable measures the ideological differences between each party, which they have 
found to increase the electoral fortunes of both parties.   
While not emphasized by Woon and Pope, both ideological variables used in their 
analysis correspond to the two conditions needed for conditional party government (CPG) 
described in Chapter 1.   As interparty ideological heterogeneity (polarization) and intraparty 
homogeneity increase, party members will strengthen positive agenda powers of their party in 
order to pursue collective goals, such as passing legislation (Rodhe 1991; Aldrich 1995).  It 
seems that the two conditions of CPG may also provide an electoral benefit for parties.     
 Little research has been conducted on the role of the party record as it relates to 
challengers.  Woon and Pope (2008), who authored the singular article to even tangentially 
address this topic, argue that only incumbents should benefit from the party record in elections, 
and there should be no impact on challengers.  Ultimately, they find that the party record has 
only a negative electoral impact on incumbents while it has a positive effect on challengers.  
Woon and Pope (2008), however, did not examine challenger entry.  Instead, they proceeded to 
examine election results without first looking at whether incumbents were challenged.    
 I hypothesize that when the incumbent‘s party record is good, fewer challengers will enter 
races against incumbents of that party.  When the record is bad, more challengers will enter in 
races against incumbents.  This hypothesis departs slightly from the work of Jacobson and 
Kernell (1983, 24-5).  They posit that parties have little control over challenger entry because of 
the weak state of political parties in the US.  In contrast to this view, I assert that political parties, 
through their actions in Congress and the reputations built by each party therein,  influence the 
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decision of potential challengers to run or not.  Jacobson and Kernell penned their seminal book 
on strategic politicians when most political scientists viewed parties as weak versions of their 
former selves.  Parties had decreased in strength across all three components—parties in 
government, parties in the electorate, and parties as organizations—leading Fiorina (1980) to 
lament the decline of collective responsibility in American politics via political parties.  
Congressional elections were viewed as candidate-centered with political parties playing 
virtually no role in the average House campaign.  Voters disliked Congress but tended to cast 
their ballots each election year for their incumbent whom they liked (Fenno 1975; Mann and 
Wolfinger 1980). 
 In the 1970s, some scholars began to challenge the prevailing view that political parties 
were weak and irrelevant.  During this time period, institutional changes in the House of 
Representatives strengthened the Democratic Caucus and weakened the power of committee 
chairmen (Rohde 1974; 1991).  Moreover, earlier changes in the composition of the Rules 
Committee made it easier for the majority party to report a bill to the floor with a favorable rule, 
which would increase the likelihood of passage.  Through caucus and House rules changes, party 
leaders were given increased power to pursue the goals of the caucus, which included passing 
legislation, reelecting party members, gaining or maintaining majority status, and safeguarding 
the party record.  Party leaders should work to improve the party record in order to provide an 
electoral benefit to party members.  A good incumbent party record provides a benefit to 
incumbents while a bad incumbent party record is an electoral burden.  In this way, changes in 
the strength of parties in government have altered the nature of Congressional elections.  
Elections are not merely candidate-centered affairs, but political parties also influence, and have 
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an interest in, the outcome of each election.   
Potential challengers, then, are not just challenging an incumbent House member who 
largely controls his/her own electoral fate.  Rather, they are also challenging the incumbent‘s 
party record.  It is possible that an incumbent MC may have a good individual reputation but 
his/her party‘s record may be bad, which could hamper his ability to win reelection.  The reverse 
may also be true--an incumbent may have a poor individual reputation, but his/her party‘s record 
strengthens his prospects for reelection.          
 As stated previously, Jacobson (1989) operationalizes a quality challenger as one who has 
held an elected position previously.   Quality challengers should pay more attention to the 
political climate, which includes the party record and national tides.  Quality challengers are or 
have been heavily involved in politics.  Moreover, potential quality challengers currently holding 
positions may have to give them up in order to run for Congress, so they must be relatively 
certain that they can legitimately contend for a seat in the House of Representatives or the Senate 
before giving up their position and the concomitant benefits of that position. 
 Jacobson and Kernell (1983, 22) present the following model of challenger entry: 
Function 2.1: U
 
= (PB) - R 
where  
U=  utility of target office 
P = probability of winning election to office  
B = value of office  
R = risk 
Using this simple utility function, there are two terms that are relevant to the discussion.  As 
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stated previously, potential quality challengers who currently hold an office must consider the 
costs of running for Congress or what Jacobson and Kernell call risks (R in Function 2.1), costs 
which may include leaving their current position.  Challengers must pay close attention to the 
probability of winning the election (P in Function 2.1), which is influenced by the party record.  
In a survey of potential House challengers, Maisel and Stone (1997) found that the most 
important determinant of whether a potential challenger decides to enter a race or not is the 
probability that he or she can actually win.
1
 This probability may be affected by the party record.  
When the incumbent's party has a negative party record, then the probability of winning 
reelection should increase and the potential challenger should be more likely to run.  When the 
opposite is true (the incumbent's party has a positive party record), then the potential challenger 
should be less likely to run for Congress.    
 
National Tides and Party Records 
One of the goals of the research conducted here is to draw distinctions between national tides and 
the party record.  In Jacobson‘s (2007) analysis of the determinants of the 2006 midterm election 
results, he attributes the Democrats‘ success to a national tide produced by the Iraq War and a 
Republican ―culture of corruption.‖  While the former is a component of a national tide, the latter 
is actually a component of the party record.  In this section, I discuss the difference between 
party records and national tides.  The two have similarities, but they are distinct concepts with 
                                                 
1Calculating the probability of winning the election is more difficult than just examining general election prospects-
-the probability of getting through the primary should be taken into account as well (Stone and Maisel 2003).  For 
the purposes of this research, because I am interested in an examination of the party record, the interplay between 
the two major political parties, and its effects on general election results, I focus exclusively on general election 
results, but it is important to remember that potential candidates must also pass the hurdle of winning the primary 
election.    
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important differences.   Table 2.1 provides a summary of these differences and similarities.  Both 
national tides and the party record influence the challenger entry calculus in a similar way.  The 
probability of winning reelection P is influenced by national tides and the party record.  National 
tides either increase or decrease P depending on if the potential challenger is affiliated with the 
party that is favored in the election.  The party record is more complex and it is the interplay 
between two party records, which influence election results, one record for the challenger‘s party 
and one record for the incumbent‘s party.  The traditional view of the party record is that only the 
incumbent is helped or hurt by the party record, but this view has been challenged by Woon and 
Pope (2008), who find that ideological reputations can help challengers.  It is possible then that 
both the incumbent and challenger party records influence challenger entry through P.  National 
tides help or hurt candidates, regardless of whether the candidate is an incumbent or challenger. 
According to most studies of the party record, it is produced by one party in one chamber of 
Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007; Woon and Pope 2008).  
Party records are largely determined by political parties and their members.  The party record can 
be helped or hurt by just a single member of a legislative party, or it can be helped or hurt by a 
collection of members.   For instance, in 2008, Vito Fossella (R-NY) was arrested for driving 
while under the influence (Hernandez 2008).  Later that Congress, it was revealed that Fossella 
had a secret family, a mistress and a child whom he had been hiding from his wife (Barron 
2008).  Fossella's unethical behavior may have hurt the Republican Party record in the House of 
Representatives.  House Democrats have also been plagued by a number of scandals during the 
period from 1970-2008.  During the 94
th
 Congress, for example, the Democratic Party record 
was damaged by a number of scandals, the most salacious of them involved sex for pay.   
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Table 2.1: Key Differences and Similarities Between National Tides and Party Records 
 
National Tides Party Record Revised Party Record 
Influence P in challenger 
entry calculus and 
retirement calculus 
Influence P in challenger 
entry calculus and retirement 
calculus 
Influence P in challenger 
entry calculus and retirement 
calculus 
Impact both challengers 
and Incumbents 
 
Impact incumbents only 
 
Impact both challengers and 
Incumbents  (Woon and 
Pope 2008) 
Produced by actions of 
multiple institutions 
Produced by actions of party 
in one chamber of Congress 
 
Produced by actions of 
President and Congress, at 
least for competence (Lebo 
and O‘Geen 2011) 
Produced by House and 
Senate (Jones and 
McDermott 2004) 
Potentially affects 
elections at all levels of 
government 
Primarily affects elections for 
one chamber of Congress 
Primarily affects elections 
for one chamber of Congress 
 
Affects elections for House 
and Senate (Jones and 
McDermott 2004) 
   
 
In 1975, a House Administration Committee staffer Elizabeth Ray alleged that she was only 
hired because she had an affair with Committee Chairman Rep. Wayne Hays (D-OH).  She was 
unqualified for the position, but because of her relationship with the Chairman, she was given the 
job (Salpukas 1976).  Hays initially denied the allegations and then admitted to the affair on the 
floor of the House.  Subsequently, he was stripped of his chairmanship (Lyons 1976).   In another 
case of sex for pay, Rep. Allan T. Howe (D-UT) was arrested for attempting to purchase sex from 
two undercover female police officers in Salt Lake City‘s red light district.  Howe was ultimately 
found guilty of a misdemeanor solicitation charge.  These are just two cases out of a collection of 
Democratic scandals which damaged the House Democrat‘s party record during the 94
th
 
Congress.  Each of these examples is an illustration of the intra-chamber nature of the party 




 The intra-chamber nature of the party record has been implicitly questioned by two 
studies.  First, Jones and McDermott (2004) use approval for Congress as a proxy for the party 
record.  Congressional Approval, however, is a measure of the approval for both the House and 
the Senate.  This is, of course, problematic when control of Congress is divided between the two 
parties with one controlling the House while the other controls the Senate.  Different parties 
cannot share the same party record, so the use of Congressional Approval as a proxy for the party 
record under these circumstances makes little sense.  Second, Lebo and O‘Geen (2011) find that 
when the President wins legislative votes (that is, the House takes the President‘s position on a 
bill via roll calls), his party in the House benefits.  They claim that this may be part of the party 
record.    
In contrast to the intra-chamber nature of the party record, national tides are often 
produced by one or more branches of government. In the 1994 midterm elections, House 
Republicans were able to nationalize House races.  Republican challengers were able to tie 
House Democratic incumbents to President Bill Clinton‘s health care policy faux pas and blame 
them for legislative gridlock (Jacobson 1996).  The nationalization of the 1994 election helped 
Republicans win majority control of the House for the first time in 40 years.  The results of the 
1994 midterm election serve as an example of a national tide in which national issues help 
determine the outcome of an election. Many use presidential approval and an economic indicator 
as independent variables associated with national tides.  Presidential approval is used as a way to 
capture general political conditions within the United States. Economic conditions are 
determined by both the economic and political systems.  Economic policies and the conditions 
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that follow from them are a result of the actions of the President, Congress, and the bureaucracy, 
among others.  In their analysis of the midterm election of 1986, Jacobson and Kernell (1990) 
conclude that both high presidential approval and relatively good economic conditions helped the 
Republican Party lose very few seats in the House (during midterm elections the President‘s 
party usually suffers significant losses, a phenomenon I discuss later in Chapter 4). Often 
national tides are produced by salient political issues that are beyond the control of one chamber 
of Congress.  For instance, according to Abramowitz (2001), President Bill Clinton‘s 
impeachment produced the second midterm gain for the President‘s party since the Civil War.  A 
voter-backlash against the impeachment proceeding produced a three seat gain for House 
Democrats.   The events of September 11, 2001 in which terrorists hijacked planes and crashed 
them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon produced a rally around the flag effect, a 
very high approval rating for President Bush‘s handling of terrorism and national security issues, 
and general approval of President Bush afterwards that helped Republicans escape the tradition 
of the President‘s party‘s midterm loss (Jacobson 2003).  Events that are historically more distant 
may also be characterized by national tides.  Carson et al (2001) describe the impact of Civil War 
casualties on the midterm Congressional elections of 1862. The authors found that the number of 
war casualties in each district hurt Republican candidates.   The Civil War was the most salient 
political issue of the time, and voters tended to blame the Republican Party for these casualties.  
As a result, they suffered at the polls. War policy and success or failure on the battlefield was the 
result of the actions of many actors within the Union government.  In the special case of war, the 
actions of the opposing force are also important.  War policy success for the Confederacy means 
war policy failure for the Union.  In sum, the national tide described by Carson et al (2001) was 
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the result of the actions taken by the President, Congress, the army and its generals, and the 
opposing government, the Confederate States of America, and its military.  In general, public 
policy and its outcomes are beyond the control of a single chamber of Congress and often 
beyond a single branch of government for that matter.  This differs from the party record which 
is determined by the actions of a party within a single chamber of Congress.   
 While the party record and national tides are generated by different components of 
government, the scope of their electoral impact is different as well.  The effect of the party record 
is likely to be smaller than that of national tides.  The party record should mostly hurt or benefit 
the electoral prospects of party members in one chamber of Congress.  Parties have given broad 
powers to party leaders in order to safeguard or improve the party record (Cox and McCubbins 
1993).  These party leaders will act to help their own members win reelection.  They are selected 
by, and responsible to, their party (to the extent they serve as faithful principals to the party 
(Sinclair 1999)).  Essentially, members of their party in the House act as another set of 
constituents to whom they must attend.  In order to hold on to their positions, they must perform 
in a way that helps these ‗constituents.‘   The Democratic leadership in the House, for example, 
manipulates their party record in order to provide an electoral benefit for House Democratic 
members.  They are less concerned with Democratic members of the Senate because they are 
selected by, and responsible to, Democratic House members.  House Democratic leaders then 
will act in a way that primarily benefits House Democrats.  This view of the party record was 
implicitly questioned by Jones and McDermott (2004) when they used approval for Congress as 
a proxy for the party record to evaluate both House and Senate elections.  
The electoral effect of national tides is broader in scope. A national tide can affect 
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elections from President to Congress to state and local races.  National tides, as stated previously, 
are usually produced by the actions of those within several branches of government and 
sometimes those outside of government.  For instance, in 1980, Republicans won both the White 
House and control of the Senate for the first time since Dwight Eisenhower was President.  
Economic performance under President Carter and Congressional Democrats had been poor.  
Coupled with the Iranian Hostage situation, the 1980 election saw a national tide that favored 
Republicans in both elected branches of the federal government.  It is possible that one branch of 
government can create a national tide, but the branch of government that seems to create such 
tides is the President, not Congress.  For instance, President Richard Nixon's involvement in the 
Watergate cover-up produced a national tide which favored Democrats in the 1974 midterm 
elections.  Watergate increased the propensity for potential Democratic challengers to run against 
Republicans (Bianco 1984).  As a result, Democrats picked up seats in both the House and 
Senate. National tides seem to stem from Presidential action, not Congress, when they originate 
from merely one branch of government 
 
Party Record Models of Challenger Entry 
In this section, I propose six distinct models of the party record and challenger entry. Multiple 
models are presented for two reasons.  First, there is a controversy in the party record literature 
regarding the impact of the party record on challengers.  The classic view of the party record 
suggests that only incumbents should be affected by the party record (Cox and McCubbins 
1993).  For challenger entry, this means that only the incumbent party record should influence 
challenger entry decisions.  Woon and Pope (2008)—vis-à-vis the classic view--find that 
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challengers benefit from party reputations.  For challenger entry, this means that the potential 
challenger‘s party record influences challenger entry decisions. In order to explore this 
discrepancy in the literature, I present several models that vary the impact of the incumbent and 
challenger party records on challenger entry.  Second, there is reason to suspect that quality 
challengers are less likely to respond to changes in the party record than nonquality challengers 
because it can be more costly for them to run.  I vary challenger quality across models in order to 
account for such a relationship.  Each model variant presented has distinct implications for 
challenger entry and the party record.   
 
Model Variant A: All Challengers with the Incumbent Party Record Only 
 In model A, only the incumbent‘s party record influences challenger entry decisions.  The 
incumbent‘s party record influences P, the probability of winning the reelection.  A ‗good‘ 
incumbent‘s party record will help dissuade potential challengers from running against him or 
her.  A ‗bad‘ party record will increase P for the potential challenger and the probability that she 
will run against the incumbent will increase.  This is the classical view of the party record, one in 
which only the incumbent benefits from the party record.  In this model, all challengers are 
equally likely to run against an incumbent.  Quality or nonquality challengers behave similarly to 
changes in P, ceteris paribus. 
 
Model Variant B: All Challengers with Challenger Party Record Only 
In model B, only the challenger‘s party record influences challenger entry decisions.  The 
party record does not provide an electoral benefit to incumbent members of the political party; 
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rather, a benefit is provided to challengers.  Party leaders safeguard or improve the party record 
in order to attract challengers to take on incumbents in the rival party.  The party record may 
serve as a kind of recruitment tool whereby party leaders attract challengers to try to gain 
majority status or increase the number of seats held by the party.  A good potential challenger 
party record increases P and the concomitant probability of challenger entry.  A bad potential 
challenger party record has the opposite effect.  In this model, all challenger entry decisions are 
equally impacted by the potential challenger‘s party record.      
 
Model Variant C: All Challengers with Incumbent Party Record and Challenger Party Record 
In model C, both the incumbent‘s and challenger‘s party records influence challenger 
entry decisions.  The party record is generated in order to provide an electoral benefit to the 
incumbent; however, it is also used as a tool to recruit potential challengers to run against 
incumbents from the rival party. Party leaders are interested in reelecting their incumbents while 
also expanding the number of seats they hold, making it easier to gain or maintain majority 
status.  Both the challenger and incumbent party records influence P.  A good incumbent party 
record will decrease P while a good challenger party record will increase P. This model does not 
distinguish between potential quality and nonquality challengers.  Each type of challenger will 
respond similarly to changes in the party record. 
 
Model Variant D: Challenger Quality with Incumbent Party Record Only 
Like model A, in model D, House elections are referenda on the incumbent and his or her 
party, and the characteristics of challengers and their parties matter very little for voters.  Unlike 
41 
 
model A, potential challengers can be distinguished by their quality.  A potential quality 
challenger is one who is familiar with the electoral process, can raise money, has some name 
recognition, and generally offers greater competition for the incumbent.  Many potential quality 
challengers are office holders when they make the decision to run for the House or not.   In many 
cases, the potential quality challenger would need to give up his other office in order to run for 
the House, either because of legal limitations or because he cannot successfully run for two 
offices at once.  In other words, there is an additional cost for potential quality challengers to run 
for the House, a cost not born by nonquality challengers.  The R in Function 2.1 represents this 
cost.  The cost is generally greater for potential quality challengers than it is for nonquality 
challengers. This means that potential nonquality challengers are more likely to respond to 
changes in the party record and are more likely to enter a race against an incumbent.  By 
contrast, potential quality challengers will only respond to major changes in the incumbent‘s 
party record because they need a higher P to offset the higher R associated with giving up a 
currently held elected position. 
 
Model Variant E: Challenger Quality with Challenger Party Record Only       
In model E, only the challenger‘s party record influences voter decisions.   Party leaders 
manipulate the party record in order to help recruit challengers to run against rival incumbents.  
Nonquality challengers are more likely to respond to these overtures via the party record from 
parties and their leaders and run against an incumbent.  Quality challengers require a stronger 
challenger party record than nonquality challengers to offset the costs associated with running for 
office and giving up an elected position.  
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Model Variant F: Challenger Quality with Incumbent and Challenger Party Records 
In model F, both the incumbent‘s and challenger‘s party records influence challenger 
entry decisions.  Knowing that both party records influence P, potential challengers will enter or 
not based in part on these party records.  Not all challengers will respond similarly to changes in 
the party record via P. Potential quality challengers are less likely to run against an incumbent 
and require a higher P than nonquality challengers to offset the higher costs (risk) that are often 
associated with being a potential quality challenger.  In other words, nonquality challengers are 
more likely to respond to changes in the party record because they do not have to contend with 
the cost of giving up a currently held elected position. 
 
Rationality, Timing, and a Critique of the Models 
These model variants assume that both quality and nonquality challengers are rational.  They are 
self-interested, utility maximizers who seek the benefits of elected office. This assumption seems 
reasonable enough for quality challengers who are seemingly more familiar with the political and 
electoral process.  They have greater experience and information, which allows them to more 
accurately gauge P than nonquality challengers.  Potential nonquality challengers, on the other 
hand, have less experience and may have a less accurate view of their chances of winning than 
quality challengers.  In contrast to the descriptions of nonquality challenger entry decisions 
discussed in models D,E, and F, nonquality challengers may not respond to changes in either the 
incumbent or challenger party records because they have an inaccurate view of P, lacking the 
experience and expertise to precisely gauge their reelection prospects.  Other nonquality 
challengers may not fit the challenger entry calculus at all because they are not interested in 
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actually winning the election and assuming the benefits of office.  Nonquality challengers may 
run for a variety of reasons other than winning the election and taking a seat in the House.   For 
instance, while working for one long shot, nonquality challenger‘s campaign for the House, he 
told me that he decided to run against a safe incumbent because he thought that the voters of that 
district deserved a choice in the general election.  The incumbent had run unopposed in the 
previous election, and my employer did not wish for that to happen again.   He did not 
necessarily expect to win.  Other candidates may run to draw attention to a particular issue or set 
of issues, not necessarily to win and gain the benefits of office.   
 In addition to the concerns raised about the rationality of nonquality challengers, the 
timing of challenger entry decisions for both nonquality and especially quality challengers may 
make it difficult to demonstrate a relationship between the party record and challenger entry.  
Potential challengers, for a variety of reasons, usually make the decision to run for the House or 
not during the first session of Congress or early into the second session.
2
   As I explain later, the 
integrity component of the party record is operationalized as a negative integrity measure based 
on each party‘s scandals in the House for each Congress.  Because many scandals are not known 
until the second session of Congress, challengers may not take these scandals (and thus negative 
integrity for the full Congress) into account when they make their decisions to run for Congress 
or not.  Timing may play a role in determining if the party record, as I later operationalize it, 
actually influences challenger entry decisions. 
 
                                                 
2
 For instance, some state or county governments require candidates to file the paperwork and in some cases collect 
enough signatures to appear on the ballot for the primary early in the second session of Congress.  Moreover, 
challengers need to identify supporters and campaign donors early so that they have the funds to run a 
competitive race against an incumbent. 
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Constructing Negative Integrity 
A negative integrity measure is created for the integrity component of the party record. This 
measure is developed by examining scandals in the House of Representatives.  In order to 
calculate a measure for negative integrity, all accusations of scandals for each Congress were 
identified using New York Times, Washington Post, Congressional Quarterly Almanacs, Herrick 
(2003), and Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (2004).  Scandal is defined as any 
behavior that breaks federal or state law or violates House Ethics rules.  Past scandal research 
has relied exclusively on Ethics Committee investigations (Peters and Welch 1980; Welch and 
Hibbing 1998) or Ethics Committee investigations coupled with Congressional Quarterly 
Almanacs.  Regarding an Ethics Committee only approach, the Committee on Standards of 
Official Conduct launched few investigations in its first few years, and after Rep. Newt 
Gingrich‘s departure from the House due to ethics concerns, an informal truce between 
Democrats and Republicans, lasting for seven years, slowed down Ethics Committee 
investigations (Babington and Morgan 2004).  In addition to these ‗slow‘ investigative periods, 
only including members investigated by the Ethics Committee is inadequate because not all 
serious accusations are investigated by the Ethics Committee.  Often, an ethically-challenged 
House member will resign to avoid an investigation by the Ethics Committee.  The Committee 
does not investigate former members, so one way to head off an investigation is to quit.  
Congressional Quarterly Almanacs list all the members investigated by the House and they even 
include some allegations of wrongdoing not investigated by the Committee, but they still do not 
include all members who face a scandal. Using newspaper reports and Herrick (2003) to 
supplement Congressional Quarterly Almanacs provides a more thorough list of scandals in the 
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House.    
After identifying a scandal, I then count the number of news stories that mention a 
scandal shown during ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news programs.  News stories are identified 
using Vanderbilt‘s Television News Archive.
3
  I search the news abstracts using the accused 
members first and last name; first name, middle initial, and last name; and finally, nickname and 
last name. I then summed all the news stories for each party‘s scandals during a particular 
Congress to get an aggregate measure of negative integrity for each party.  News stories that 
featured more than one party member accused of scandal were not double-counted; however, a 
news story that featured members of both parties accused of scandal was counted towards the 
negative integrity measures for each party.    
 Many scandals continue to generate news stories past the initial Congress in which the 
scandal broke.  As a result, there is what I call a ‗scandal hangover.‘  Scandal hangover refers to 
the news stories generated after the Congress during which the scandal was first reported.   I find 
that the scandal hangover is substantial for Democrats.  A measure of negative integrity that only 
counted new stories generated by scandals that were generated during the Congress that the 
scandal broke substantially underestimates Democratic Negative Integrity.  The impact on 
Republican Negative Integrity (RNI) is much less.  For instance, during the 96
th
 Congress (the 
1980 election), Democratic Negative Integrity (DNI) would consist of 84 stories if only stories 
attributed to scandals that broke during the 96
th
 were included; however, several trials and ethics 
proceedings related to Koreagate (which was initially reported during the 95
th
 Congress) 
                                                 
3
    Dancy (2010) develops a nonpartisan measure of aggregate scandal publicity using evening news stories from 
ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news stories.  The measure developed here is partisan and uses a different search 
procedure than Dancey uses to construct his measure.  He searches for general scandal terms, whereas I search 
using the names of those accused of scandal. 
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occurred during the 96
th
.  57 stories related to scandals that broke during the previous Congress 
were reported on the evening news during the 96
th
 Congress.  Not including these 57 stories 
substantially underestimates DNI for the 96
th
 Congress.  I, therefore, count news stories 
attributed to scandals from the previous Congress in DNI and RNI scores for each Congress.    
Using television news stories as a measure of negative integrity poses both advantages 
and disadvantages for the research undertaken in this study.  Evening news programs are 
constrained in their coverage of important events by limited air time of one half-hour per day.  
This means that more serious scandals should be covered by television media, leaving out less 
serious but still potentially important scandals.  Also news coverage from a scandal can proceed 
for more than two Congresses (although this is rare), and the measure I have constructed does 
not account for news coverage that lasts for more than two Congresses.  On the flip side, millions 
of viewers get their news from evening news programs, and since the negative integrity measure 
is meant to reflect changes in the reputation of a Congressional political party, then a medium 
which reaches and potentially influences the opinions and attitudes of millions may serve as a 
particularly good measure of negative integrity.   
Television news stories are one means by which a measure of negative integrity could be 
constructed.  Alternatively, one could use newspaper articles in a similar way, but Puglisi and 
Snyder (2011) have shown that papers with liberal editorial pages tend to overreport Republican 
scandals while those with conservative editorial pages overreport Democratic scandals.  No such 
findings exist for evening news programs. Moreover, newspaper coverage may have a regional 
bias, over reporting some scandals while underreporting others (Brown 2001).  This does not 
appear to be the case with evening news programs.  Another potential alternative to this measure 
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is the creation of one or more factors through factor analysis.  Unfortunately, the number of time 
points under study is too few for factor analysis to be conducted.  Factor analysis methodologists 
offer various recommendations about the number of observations required for factor analysis.  
Most, however, seem to agree that at least 100 observations are necessary (Kline 1993). 
Table 2.2 shows summary statistics for Democratic and Republican Negative Integrity while 
Figure 2.1 shows both Democratic and Republican Negative Integrity over time.  Overall, 
Republicans, until recently, maintained lower levels of Negative Integrity than Democrats.  
Comparing the two medians, Republicans had a median of 5.5 stories per Congress while 
Democrats had a median of 31 per Congress.  For the 1970s through the very early 1980s, 
Republicans had relatively low levels of Negative Integrity while Democrats had much higher 
levels. This period featured two major scandals, Koreagate and ABSCAM, which primarily 
affected Democrats.  Not coincidentally, this is also the period when the House passed a code of 
ethics in response to the many scandals involving its members. RNI was largest during the 109
th
 
Congress (the 2006 election), a period with a large number of scandals, but two in particular, the 
Mark Foley page scandal and the many ethics problems faced by Tom Delay contributed most to 
RNI.  Because Negative Integrity is a count, the standard deviation for both DNI and RNI is 
rather high, 41.6 for DNI and 35.0 for RNI. For most of the time period under study, Negative 
Integrity for each party behaves largely as expected, increasing as the number and seriousness of 
scandals increases, save for the 1992 election (102
nd
 Congress).  The DNI score is a mere 21 for 
this period.  There are two reasons for the discrepancy between actual DNI and the expectation of 
a large DNI for this period.  First, I only counted stories regarding the 20 most prolific check 
kiters identified by the Associated Press. The rest of the 280+ members were excluded from my 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Democratic and Republican Negative Integrity 
 
 Democrat Republican 
Median 31 5.5 
Mean 46.6 20.9 
Standard Deviation 41.6 35.0 
Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 143 148 
N 20 20 
   
 
search.  Second, TV news did not spend a great deal of time covering the House Bank Scandal.  
It seems that political science researchers have devoted more time to this scandal than the 
evening news did.   
 
Assessing Content and Convergent Validation 
Adock and Collier (2001) identify three types of measurement validation: content, convergent, 
and construct validation.  Content validation means that the measurement developed ―captures 
the full content of the systematized concept‖ (538).  In the context of integrity, do DNI and RNI 
adequately represent the concept of the integrity dimension of the party record?  Convergent 
validation means that there is a relationship between the measure developed and other indicators 
thought to measure similar concepts (540).  Construct validation requires hypothesis testing with 
dependent variables that should co-vary with the measure. Tests for construct validation are 
conducted on challenger entry later in this chapter along with retirements and election results in 
subsequent chapters.   
Content Validation 
 DNI and RNI tap only potential negative changes in the way voters perceive each political 










component of the party record in a positive way.  Perhaps the passage of ethics legislation or 
voting to decline pay raises increases a party‘s reputation for integrity.  The inability to 
incorporate positive change in the integrity component of the party record is one shortcoming of 
a strictly negative integrity measure. 
 Another problem worth noting is that scandals may continue to generate news stories for 
several Congresses beyond the initial Congress in which allegations were made.  If DNI and RNI 
included only news stories from the initial Congress during which allegations of impropriety 
were made, then these measures may underestimate negative integrity.  For instance, accusations 
of impropriety against Speaker Jim Wright (D-TX) surfaced during the 100
th
 Congress, but much 
of the media coverage surrounding the scandal occurred during the 101
st










































news stories generated during the 101
st
 are not included in DNI because only stories aired during 
the Congress during which the scandal broke are included.  In an effort to account for this effect, 
I performed a second search for each member of Congress accused of scandal for the next 
Congress (scandal hangover).  A count of these stories is added to the relevant Congress.  In 
some cases, however, scandals may continue to increase negative integrity past two Congresses, 
but this is rare.     
 
Convergent Validation  
How do DNI and RNI relate to other measures of negative integrity?  No other aggregate 
measures of negative integrity are found in the literature; however, I have calculated the scandal 
rate (number of MCs accused of scandal divided by party caucus size), guilty rate (number of 
MCs found guilty of a crime or misdemeanor divided by caucus size), and punish rate (number 
of MCs punished by House divided by caucus size) for each party-Congress.  I compare 
Republican and Democratic news stories from the Congress during which the scandal broke are 
included.  This is not the same as comparing DNI and RNI to these other indicators because DNI 
and RNI include scandal hangover; however, the correlations that follow give a rough indication 
of how DNI and RNI compare with other potential measures.   Democratic news stories are most 
closely correlated with punish rate with a correlation of 0.64, followed by guilty rate with a 
correlation of 0.43 and scandal rate with a correlation of 0.26.  The correlation between 
Republican news stories and scandal rate is 0.75, punish rate is 0.70, and guilty rate is 0.28.  
Democratic stories seem to be a better reflection of the severity of the accusations while 
Republican stories are an indicator of both the breadth of scandal cases as well as punishment by 
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Congress.  The differences between the correlations of these various indicators with Democratic 
and Republican news stories stem from a higher average number of TV stories per scandal for 
Republicans at the individual level while at the same time historically Republicans have had 
lower caucus sizes.   Republican scandals generate a higher number of stories than Democratic 
scandals; however, this difference is not significant.
4
   
 
Variables 
The dependent variables are Democrat Challenger Rate (DCR) and Democrat Quality 
Challenger Rate (DQR).  DCR is calculated by counting the number of Democratic challengers 
for each election and dividing by the number of Republican incumbents who chose to run for 
reelection. I then take the first difference of the variable.  To calculate DQR, I count the number 
of Democratic quality challengers for each election and divide by the number of Republican 
incumbents who chose to run for reelection.
5
  Quality challengers are those challengers who have 
previously held elected office.   Table 2.3 lists the independent variables and their hypothesized 
impact on aggregate challenger entry.  
Some alterations to DNI and RNI are required for dealing with challenger entry. I have 
recalculated DNI and RNI in order to take into account the timing of challenger decision making.  
As stated previously, challengers typically make their decisions at the beginning of an election 
year or even the year before.  To account for this timing issue, DNI and RNI include only scandal 
stories reported during the first session of each Congress.  Using these altered measures of DNI  
                                                 
4
 I estimated a negative binomial regression model with the count of an individual ethically-challenged MC‘s 
scandal stories as the dependent variable and for independent variables: a dummy for party, a dummy for 
punished or not, a dummy for guilty or not, and a dummy for a moral scandal.  Party was not significant while all 
other variables attained significance. 
5
 The data used to calculate the dependent variables were provided by Dr. Gary C. Jacobson. 
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Table 2.3 Independent Variables and Hypothesized Relationships with 
DCR and DQR 
 
Presidential Approval + 
Income + 
Democrat President - 
Polarization - 
DHA - 




and RNI, I subtract RNI from DNI to create the measure, Democratic Negative Integrity 
Advantage (DNIA).  I expect that both challenger and incumbent party records influence 
challenger entry and that it is the difference between these two reputations that will ultimately 
influence challenger decisions.  
The ideology party record component is comprised of two parts.
6
  First, the ideological 
polarization of each party is calculated.  First dimension DW-NOMINATE scores are used to 
find the median voter of each party for each Congress.  I then subtract the Republican median 
from the Democratic median to calculate Polarization.  
   Second, the homogeneity of each party acts as a measure of ideological signal strength to 
the electorate.  Ideological homogeneity is calculated by taking the standard deviation of each 
party‘s DW-NOMINATE scores for a given Congress (Woon and Pope 2008).  DW-NOMINATE 
scores are the standard ideological measure used in Congressional research (Poole and Rosenthal 
1997).   I subtract Republican heterogeneity from Democratic heterogeneity to calculate 
Democratic Heterogeneity Advantage (DHA). Since the ideological reputation of each party 
should be relatively consistent from the beginning to the end of a Congress, no amendments 
should be needed to deal with the timing of challenger entry decisions.   
                                                 
6
 Woon and Pope (2008) do not include a measure of ideological extremity in their models.  Following their 
example, I also do not include such a variable in the models.  
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For competence, I use Democratic Win Rate.
7
  Democratic Win Rate is the proportion of 
votes won by Democrats in the House for each Congress.  This measure gauges the interaction 
between two parties, both the challenger‘s and the incumbent‘s.  Lebo and O‘Geen (2011) lag 
Democratic Win Rate by one Congress, and I follow this convention for challenger entry.    
In addition to measures for the party record, two national tide variables are included.  
Presidential Approval is the percentage of the public that approves of the President in December 
of every odd numbered year.  This measure is taken from the Gallup Survey.  Because of the 
timing of challenger decisions, I have chosen the last Gallup Survey before each election year to 
gauge Presidential Approval. For all years when the Republicans control the presidency, 
Presidential Approval is multiplied by -1.  Additionally, Democratic President is a dummy 
variable, coded 1 for Democratic presidents and 0 otherwise (Jacobson 1989).  Income is 
included as an indicator of economic performance.  For challenger entry, Income is the natural 
log of US per capita income in 2008 dollars in the year preceding the election to account for the 
timing of challenger entry decisions.  
 
Democratic Challenger Entry 
Figure 2.2 shows DCR and DQR from 1970-2008.  Since DCR contains all challengers, 
including quality challengers, there are likely to be similarities.  For both DCR and DQR, the 
maximum value is reached during the 1974 election, the first election that occurred post-
Watergate.  The minimum values, however, are reached at different points in time.  For DCR, the 
minimum occurs during the 1998 midterm election while DQR reaches its minimum during the 
1990 midterm election. Interestingly, the rate of Democratic Quality Challengers in the 2006 
                                                 
7
 This measure was provided by Dr. Matthew Lebo.  
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midterm election and 2008 Presidential election was below the mean of 0.21 in both cases, but 
DCR was above the average of 0.88 in both cases.   
Table 2.4 shows the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of Democratic 
Challenger Rate.  The results show that neither of the two national tide variables is significant.  
First differences were taken on variables that had unit roots, indicated by the results of Dickey-
Fuller tests.
8
  It seems that, at least in Model I, national tide variables do not significantly predict 
DCR when party record variables are included in the same model. 
Party record variables performed better.  DHA is significant but in the opposite direction 
from what was expected.  It seems that as the difference between Democratic heterogeneity and 
Republican heterogeneity increases, then DCR increases.  It could be that as Democrats have a 
 
Figure 2.2: Democratic Challenger and Democratic Quality Challenger Rate, 1970-2008 
                                                 
8
 Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests for stationarity were also performed and corroborated the results 














































Table 2.4: OLS Regression of Democratic Challenger Rate, 1970-2008 
 
 Model I Model II 
Democratic President -0.2815*   -0.3579* 
 (0.1153)    (0.1158) 
Presidential Approval 0.0018    0.0022* 
 (0.0010)    (0.001) 
∆ln(Income) 0.3663    0.5326* 
 (0.2317)    (0.2357) 
∆Democratic Win Ratet-1 0.1342*   0.1464* 
 (0.0593)    (0.0554) 
Democratic President Win Ratet-1  0.0004 
  (0.0002) 
∆Polarization -0.9681    -0.6685 
 (0.5460)    (0.5354) 
DHA 2.5275**  2.4820** 
 (0.6926)    (0.6427) 
DNIA -0.0010*   -0.0010* 
 (0.0004)    (0.0004) 
Intercept 0.9565** 1.0027** 
 (0.0539)    (0.0567) 
N 20 20 
Adjusted R2 0.659 0.707 
Breusch-Godfrey LM χ2=0.359, p>0.549 χ2=0.267, p>0.605 
Durbin-Watson d 2.07 1.65 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root z(t)=-4.74, p>0.0001 z(t)=-4.12, p>0.0009 
   
Note: p<0.05*, p<0.01**, standard errors in parentheses 
 
more heterogeneous caucus compared to Republicans, they appeal to a greater number of 
potential challengers.  DNIA is significant at the 0.05 level.  For each additional scandal news 
story that Democrats have over the Republican scandal story total, Democratic Challenger Rate 
decreases by 0.1 percentage points.   In most years, DNIA does not have a substantial impact, but 
in some years, such as the 1990 election in which a scandal involving Speaker Jim Wright 
pushed the difference between negative integrity rates to a high of 102 news stories, then DNIA 
depressed DCR by 10.2 percentage points.  The competence component of the party record 
attains significance at the 0.01 level.  For each additional point in ∆Democratic Win Ratet-1, DCR 
increases by 14.5 percentage points.  An Adjusted R
2
 of 0.659 indicates that the model explains a 
substantial amount of the variation in ∆DCR, given the parameters estimated.   The results of 
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Dickey-Fuller test performed on the residuals of the model indicate that I can reject the null 
hypothesis that there is a unit root.  The Breusch-Godfrey LM statistic indicates that I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation.   The Shapiro-Wilk W test for 
normality conducted on the residuals indicates that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
residuals are normally distributed.  
In Model II, I estimate a similar model, but I also include Democratic President Win 
Ratet-1.  Lebo and O‘Geen (2011) claim that when House Democrats support the President of 
their own party, the party record may improve and boost their prospects for reelection.  This 
measure is calculated by finding the proportion of votes in which House Democrats supported a 
Democratic President‘s position on a given roll call.  For DCR, Democratic President Win Rate is 
not significant, but with this variable in the model, Income and Presidential Approval attain 
significance while party record variables maintain significance.  Standard tests show that 
autocorrelation is not problematic in Model II nor is there a unit root.  
The results for DNIA and ∆Democratic Win Ratet-1 provide support for the contention that 
both party records influence aggregate challenger entry.  Each of these variables is the result of 
the interplay between the two parties.  An alternative model of DCR which includes DNI and 
RNI as separate variables shows that neither is significant (although DNI is significant in a two-
tailed test).  It is the advantage of one party‘s record over the other that is important for aggregate 
challenger entry. The statistical significance of DNIA provides evidence that the negative 
integrity measure created for the integrity component of the party record is valid.  Specifically, 
construct validation requires using the measure in hypothesis testing on a dependent variable for 
which it should help predict changes.  The results here provide leverage for construct validation 
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of negative integrity.    
The results of the regression of DQR for Model I presented in Table 2.5 reveal that 
quality challengers, at least in the aggregate, do not respond to party record variables or national 
tide variables.   As explained earlier in the discussion of the individual level model of challenger 
entry, quality challengers may require a higher P (probability of winning the election) than 
nonquality challengers before deciding to challenge an incumbent.  The impact of both national 
tide and party record variables on P may not be large enough to influence aggregate quality 
challenger entry.   Breusch-Godfrey LM test indicates no significant autocorrelation.  The 
Dickey-Fuller test performed on the residuals indicates no unit root, and results from the 
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality indicate that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
residuals are normally distributed.  
In Model II in Table 2.5, I include Democratic Presidential Win Ratet-1.  In contrast to the 
models which included all challengers, quality challengers, at least in the aggregate, appear to 
respond to Democratic Presidential Win Ratet-1.  For each percentage point increase in 
Democratic Presidential Win Rate, DQR increases by an average of 0.1 percent points.  Both 
Presidential Approval and DHA also achieve significance, but DHA is in the opposite direction 
from what was expected.   For each additional percentage point increase in Presidential 
Approval, DQR increases by an average of 0.34 percentage points.  DHA is significant but in the 
opposite direction from what is expected.  Perhaps quality challengers are drawn to more 
ideologically diverse parties.  
It is possible that the party record influences quality challenger entry in some elections 
and not others.  Perhaps the strength of the party record is dependent on the level of partisanship 
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in the House.  I ran models of DCR and DQR which included the interaction term, 
DNIA*Democratic Unityt-1.  These interaction terms were not significant.  I also included this 
term in models of aggregate retirements and seat change in Chapters 3 and 4 and also found no 
effect.  It seems that the party record does not interact with partisanship to produce effects in 
some elections and not others.       
The analysis of aggregate quality challenger entry presented in this section has numerous 
implications for the discussion of the party record.  First, and perhaps the most significant 
finding in this chapter, the statistical significance of party record variables shows that all 
challengers, at least in the aggregate, take the integrity and competence components of the party 
record into account when making entry decisions.    
Table 2.5: OLS Regression of Democratic Quality Challenger Rate, 1970-2008 
 
 Model I Model II 
Democratic President -0.2600    -0.4505* 
 (0.1997)    (0.1692) 
Presidential Approval 0.0023    0.0034* 
 (0.0018)    (0.0015) 
∆ln(Income) -0.0289    0.3855 
 (0.4012)    (0.3443) 
∆Democratic Win Ratet-1 0.0407    0.0713 
 (0.1027)    (0.081) 
Democratic Presidential Win Ratet-1  0.0010* 
  (0.0003) 
∆Polarization 0.2845    1.031 
 (0.9453)    (0.7822) 
DHA 2.4038    2.2904* 
 (1.1991)    (0.939) 
DNIA -0.0006    -0.0008 
 (0.0007)    (0.0006) 
Intercept 0.3222**  0.4373** 
 
 (0.0932) (0.0828) 
N 20 20 
Adjusted R2 0.236 0.532 
Breusch-Godfrey LM χ2=0.124, p>0.7244 χ2=0.098, p>0.7547 
Durbin-Watson d 1.966 1.739 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root z(t)=-4.07, p>0.0011 z(t)=-3.54, p>0.0071 
   




Second, the results show that both the incumbent and challenger party records seem to influence 
aggregate challenger entry.  Each of the party record variables is operationalized in such a way 
that each variable is a reflection of the interaction between the two parties and requires both 
party records.  These results demonstrate that Woon and Pope‘s assertion about election results 
also extends to challenger entry.  
Third, the analysis provides support for negative integrity‘s construct validation.  In the 
DCR models, negative integrity attained significance.   
 Fourth, national tide variables performed poorly in each of the models when party record 
variables were included, except in the models that featured Democratic President Win Rate.  
Surprisingly, Presidential Approval failed to attain significance in the models (again except when 
Democratic President Win Ratet-1 was included).  Party record variables, on the other hand, 
attained significance in the model of DCR but not DQR, save Democratic President Win Rate.  
While I do not show the results here, I re-estimated two models of DCR with one that only 
included national tide variables and another with only party record variables.  Just like in the full 
model of DCR, in the party record model, both the integrity and competence components 
attained significance while DHA attained significance but in the opposite direction from that 
which I expected.  In the model of only national tide variables, both income and presidential 
approval attain significance, something that they could not do in the full model of DCR.  
 Fifth, the failure of most of the party record variables to predict DQR is probably related 
to the higher P (probability of winning the election) threshold required for quality challengers to 
challenge incumbents.  In many cases, quality challengers must give up an elected position to run 
for Congress, increasing R (the risk of running for Congress) in their calculi. 
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 Finally, taken together, the results show that Model Variant F best represents aggregate 
challenger entry.  Model Variant F states that both incumbent and challenger entry decisions 
affect challenger entry and quality challengers do not respond to changes in the party record 
because these changes do not provide a large enough impact on P (probability of winning 
reelection) to offset their higher R value. 
 
Conclusion 
Both party record variables and national tide variables influence aggregate challenger entry.  In 
the analysis conducted in this chapter, I found support for Woon and Pope‘s contention that both 
the challenger‘s and incumbent‘s party records may be important.  I have also found support for 
the validation of the negative integrity measure used in this chapter.   Additionally, while not 
necessarily central to the analysis of the party record, I have found that all challengers seem to fit 
Jacobson and Kernell‘s challenger entry calculus while quality challengers require a higher P 
(probability of winning reelection) value than non-quality challengers.  
 Looking ahead to Chapter 3, voluntary departures from the House of Representatives are 
examined.   Many of the same questions related to the party record that were addressed in this 





Chapter 3: The Party Record and Retirements from the House of Representatives 
 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, in his efforts to wrest control of the House away from 
Democrats, Representative Newt Gingrich (R-GA) made ethics a cornerstone of his attack 
strategy.  For nearly 40 years, Democrats had maintained control of the House.  During that time, 
Gingrich argued, the Democrats had become entrenched, corrupt, and unethical.  Scandals in the 
late 1980s only further supported Gingrich‘s argument.  Mario Biaggi (D-NY) was nearly 
expelled for bribery, Barney Frank (D-MA) hired a male escort as a housekeeper who then ran a 
prostitution ring out of Frank‘s home, Speaker Jim Wright (D-TX) was also implicated in 
wrongdoing.  The largest scandal was the House Bank scandal in which hundreds of members, 
both Democratic and Republican, wrote bad checks from their House Bank accounts. The worst 
offenders generally came from the Democratic Party, which served to support Gingrich‘s 
narrative of an out-of-control, unaccountable, and corrupt Democratic Party.  The House Bank 
scandal drew the ire of voters and weakened the election prospects of several candidates, leading 
to a substantial number of Democratic retirements.  To add to the election woes of the 
Democratic leadership in the House, 1992 was also the last year that many House members could 
pocket excess campaign cash for their own personal use upon retirement, and many House 
members, especially Democrats, decided to take the money and not run (Groseclose and 
Krehbiel 1994).  Democrats were left with a high number of open seats to defend, and 
Republicans were able to capitalize on the Democrats‘ misfortune.  Republicans would not win 
back the House in ‘92, but they made significant gains, aided by Democratic scandal.  The 
argument presented in this chapter is that strategic retirements are influenced by the reputations 
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of Congressional parties.   In the case of the 102
nd 
Congress House Democrats, the House Bank 
scandal hurt the election prospects of more than just those members who actually bounced 
checks, it hurt all members of the Democratic Party.   I argue that House Democrats as a whole 
were more likely to retire in 1992 because of their poor party record.  Put another way, the House 
Bank scandal did not just increase the propensity of Democratic check kiters to retire, but it 
increased the propensity of all Democrats to retire, even those not involved in scandal.  
Rep. Tom Delay (R-TX) was part of that successful revolution to overthrow what 
Gingrich and other House Republicans in 1992 and 1994 termed, an arrogant, entrenched, and 
corrupt Democratic majority.  The Republicans successfully made ethics a cornerstone of their 
bid to take back the House in 1992 and 1994.  In 2005, however, the tide had turned: Delay 
stepped down from his post amid accusations of ethical missteps and announced his retirement 
later that Congress, a Congress that witnessed a plethora of Republican scandals.  Rep. Duke 
Cunningham (R-CA) resigned from the House of Representatives rather than account for the 
poorly hidden bribes he accepted from a defense contractor.  Bob Ney (R-OH) resigned from the 
House amid serious accusations of accepting bribes in connection with the Jack Abramoff-Indian 
imbroglio.  Later during the 109
th
 Congress, Representative Mark Foley's (R-FL) incessant 
sexual advances towards under-age, male congressional pages were reported by the media, and it 
was later disclosed that Republican House leaders were aware of some of Foley's inappropriate 
behavior.  The Democratic minority pounced on the emerging scandals, calling the ethical 
environment created by the Republicans a ―culture of corruption.‖   
 Democrats running for reelection were not the only ones paying attention to the GOP's 
ethics' troubles. It appears that the public too recognized the ethical problems of the Republican 
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Party.  A Washington Post-ABC News poll taken in April 2006 found that 52% of the public 
trusted the Democrats to handle corruption in Washington while only 26% trusted Republicans to 
do the same (Edsall and Cillizza 2006).  The public appears to have correctly associated most of 
the scandals that hit Washington in the 109
th
 Congress with the Republican Party.  Furthermore, 
the House GOP's reputation for scandal was not lost on Democratic candidates. Indeed, as noted 
in Chapter 2, several Democratic challengers tied the Republican incumbents they were running 
against to the Mark Foley scandal through their affiliation with the Republican Party (Hulse and 
Zeleny 2006).  Being distinguished among the two parties as the party of scandal may have 
hampered Democratic efforts to hold onto the House in ‘92 and ‘94, and it may have hurt 
Republican efforts to hold onto majority status in the House 12 years later in 2006.  Just like the 
Democratic majority in 1992, the Republican Party brand had been tainted by scandal, and that 
brand became an electoral burden, rather than a benefit, for its candidates.   
 In my preceding discussion of the 1992 and 2006 House elections, I assume that parties 
in Congress develop a reputation in the electorate.  Moreover, a candidate's party label has a 
reputation attached to it, tying him and his electoral (mis)fortunes to the party.  The notion that 
party labels influence election outcomes is not a new concept.  As I discussed in Chapter 2, 
national tides have long been part of the Congressional research repertoire.  Jacobson and 
Kernell (1983) and Jacobson (1989) found that national tides, favoring one party or the other, 
influence campaign contributions, challenger entry, congressional retirements, and ultimately, 
election results.  Carson et al (2001) examine House elections during the Civil War, finding 
evidence of a national tide that worked against Republicans in the 1862-63 midterm election.  
Similarly, McGhee (2008) finds evidence for national tides in House election results from 1976 
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to 2006.  These studies tend to focus on variables such as presidential approval or economic 
indicators, which lie beyond the control of just one chamber of Congress, ignoring those 
variables that lie directly under the purview of the House of Representatives, like scandal.  In this 
chapter, I argue that the party record, through its impact on the electoral fortunes of 
Representatives, influence the decision to retire or run for reelection in the aggregate.  For 
Republican incumbents in 2006, this means that all members, not just those actually accused of 
scandal, are more likely to retire because of a poor record for integrity.  For Democratic 
incumbents in 1992, all members, not just those involved in the House Bank scandal or caught 
up in other ethical misdeeds, saw their electoral prospects grow slightly dimmer due to a poor 
record for integrity.    In this chapter, I provide a party record related theory of individual 
retirements for House members accused of scandal.      
 
Cartel Theory and the Party Record 
Cox and McCubbins (1993; 2005) further elaborate on the relationship between party reputations 
and election outcomes in their cartel theory of legislative organization, providing a bridge to 
explanatory variables more easily controlled by the House   Under cartel theory, the majority 
party organizes the House to provide it with substantial advantages over the minority—eg 
stacking committees, possessing all committee and subcommittee chairmanships, choosing the 
Speaker, and picking the rules for each Congress. These advantages allow the majority party to 
keep from being rolled by the minority.   Furthermore,  parties empower their leaders to solve 
collective action dilemmas such as maintaining or gaining a majority of seats, passing 
legislation, and improving the party record   The latter concept is the one most applicable to this 
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study.  The party record is a party's reputation in the electorate.   The party record may affect the 
electoral prospects of each party's candidates running for election or reelection.  Party leaders are 
expected to improve the party record and safeguard it from harm.  A positive party record may 
prove beneficial on Election Day while a negative party record may hurt the reelection prospects 
of individual party members and the odds of the party gaining or maintaining majority status.  
Reputations for integrity and competence in governing are essential components of the party 
record.   As Cox and McCubbins put it, ―substantial components of the party record affect all its 
members similarly: for example, all are hurt by scandal or helped by perceptions of competence, 
honesty and integrity‖ (1993; 122). 
 Previous studies focusing on the party record look solely at election results.  Cox and 
McCubbins (1993) find that election results in the House move in swings, favoring one party or 
the other, and they cite this finding as evidence of a party record.  Jones and McDermott (2004) 
find that approval of Congress increases the likelihood of voting for the majority party in both 
the House and the Senate, findings which they believe support the existence of the party record.  
Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007) find that the passage of legislation improves the party record 
and helps the majority party pick up seats. Finally, Woon and Pope (2008) examine House 
election results and conclude that party labels can also have an impact on challenger success.  
 Missing from these studies is an examination of legislative career decisions. 
Understanding why members voluntarily exit an exclusive institution such as the House for 
private life is compelling and beneficial to the study of Congress.  Indeed, many scholars have 
recognized the importance of studying retirement decisions (Cooper and West 1981; Hibbing 
1982a). Protected by incumbency advantage, retirement has become the way in which the 
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majority of House members leave the institution.   Moreover, membership change is one of the 
chief means by which public policy is changed (Brady and Sinclair 1984), so the study of 
retirements could shed additional light on the process of policy change.  Ultimately, uncovering 
the reasons for voluntary exits from the House, then, becomes vital for a fuller understanding of 
American politics.   
 I intend to offer a theory of retirements from the House that revolves around the party 
record.  I expect that the party record should impact career decisions.  Put simply, a negative 
party record should lead to more retirements for a political party while a positive record should 
lead to fewer retirements.  Before delving further into the party record, the literature on 
Congressional retirements is reviewed.  
 
Retirements: Where does the Party Record Fit In? 
Previous studies of Congressional retirements focus on three broad explanations—institutional 
changes, personal factors, and electoral vulnerability. 
 A dramatic increase in retirements in the 1970s led congressional researchers to suggest 
that serving in Congress was no longer any fun (Cooper and West 1981).  Changes in House and 
caucus rules may have contributed to this feeling of dissatisfaction (Hibbing 1982b).  The 
Subcommittee Bill of Rights enacted in 1971 weakened committee chairmen, decentralized the 
committee structure in the House, and strengthened political parties (Rohde 1974).  These 
changes may not have sat well for some House members, especially those who had amassed a 
great deal of seniority (Hibbing 1982b).  After the passage of the Subcommittee Bill of Rights, 
many House members soon realized that holding a committee chairmanship was no longer as 
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lucrative.  Moreover, seniority no longer automatically ensured a chairmanship.  Rohde (1991) 
notes that several majority party members with seniority were denied committee chairmanships.  
Hibbing (1982a) finds that seniority increases the propensity to retire in the 1970s; however, 
Wolak (2007), using aggregate data over a much longer time period, finds that violations of 
seniority are not a significant cause of retirements.  In addition to the changes in House and 
caucus rules, political campaigns have changed.  Members of Congress have to spend more time 
campaigning and raising money to hold on to their seats, a prospect that may be undesirable to 
some incumbents. Hibbing (1982b) notes that the increase in campaign spending means that 
incumbents have to raise more campaign funds than ever, an activity that few candidates enjoy.   
Later studies testing the ―no longer fun‖ argument fail to find evidence that this continues to be a 
major source of retirements, Moore and Hibbing (1992) and Livingston and Friedman (1993) 
posit that the 1970s were an aberration in the history of Congressional retirements.  Using data 
from the 1980s, neither study finds evidence tying dissatisfaction to retirements. 
  In addition to institutional changes and their concomitant dissatisfaction, personal factors 
impact Congressional retirements.  Most studies of House retirements find that age increases the 
propensity that a member of Congress will retire (Brace 1985; Hibbing 1982a; Kiewiet and Zeng 
1993; Livingston and Friedman 1993; Moore and Hibbing 1992; 1998).  This relationship, 
however, does not seem to hold for aggregate retirements (Wolak 2007).  As a member ages, he 
or she is less able, theoretically at least, to perform such a demanding job.  Looking beyond age, 
1992 presented an unusual situation for many House members, which spurred an increase in 
retirements. It was the last year in which some members of the House could pocket campaign 
funds when they retired. Several members did indeed take advantage of this loophole in election 
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law and retired (Clarke et al. 1999; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994).  Furthermore, changes in the 
pension benefits led to an increase in retirements (Hall and Van Houwelling 1995).    
 Moore and Hibbing (1998) offer a theory of situational dissatisfaction to account for 
House retirements. Situational dissatisfaction refers to the inability of a member to pursue his or 
her trio of goals—reelection, internal advancement, and making good public policy (Fenno 
1978), which leads to a greater propensity to retirement.  Making good public policy and internal 
advancement are both difficult to pursue when in the minority party.  Since members of the 
minority are not able to hold chairmanships or pursue policy goals, they are more likely to retire 
(Ansolabehere and Gerber 1997; Brace 1985; Gilmour and Rothstein 1993; Kiewiet and Zeng 
1993; Livingston and Friedman 1993; Moore and Hibbing 1998). However, if minority party 
members have a realistic shot of winning a majority of seats, they are less likely to retire (Wolak 
2007).  The benefits of majority status seem to keep majority party members around. 
Additionally, those in positions of power (committee or party) seem less apt to retire.  
 The last major explanation for Congressional retirements corresponds to the reelection 
goal.  Electoral vulnerability increases the odds of retirement from the House.  Incumbents who 
see their reelection prospects as dim will be less likely to assume the costs—time, money, etc.-- 
of running for reelection.  Previous vote share or margin of victory is negatively associated with 
the propensity to retire (Brace 1985; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993).  Furthermore, redistricting can 
also increase retirements (Brace 1985; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993) although not in the aggregate 
(Wolak 2007).  When a member's district is eliminated after redistricting, he or she can either 
retire or run for election in another district, often against an incumbent.  Also, the boundaries of 
their districts may change in a way that significantly disadvantages them in the next election, 
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putting more Republican voters in a district held by a Democrat or more Democratic voters in a 
district currently held by a Republican.  Rather than face a tough reelection battle, they may 
simply choose to retire.  In either case of redistricting, P is reduced (the reelection goal 
hindered), prompting some members of Congress to retire.  
 In addition to redistricting, national level phenomena may also affect election results and 
the decision to retire. National tides favoring one party or the other can hurt or help the electoral 
fortunes of incumbents (Carson et al 2001; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Jacobson 1989; McGhee 
2008).  As one member of Congress put it when discussing electoral vulnerability, ―I went from 
69 percent to 51 percent in the space of two years.  I knew that if my party had a bad year, it 
would be all over for me‖ (p. 64 quoted in Hibbing 1982b).   National tide phenomena, like 
Presidential Approval or the performance of the economy, can have a marginal impact on 
retirement decisions (Jacobson and Kernell 1983; but see Livingston and Friedman 1993).   
 
The Party Record: Competence, Integrity, and Ideology 
Using the foundation laid by Moore and Hibbing (1998), I argue that changes in the party record 
have an effect on the goals of Representatives. The party record, like national tides, influences 
the most important of legislator goals identified by Fenno (1978), the goal of reelection. The 
party record can help or hurt the reelection goal, altering the probability of winning reelection.  A 
party with a good reputation for competence, ethics, and ideology is likely to help its members' 
reelection bids; whereas, a party with a bad reputation is likely to damage its members' reelection 
prospects. In a party record model of retirements, Representatives pay attention to the records of 
their parties when making the decision to run for reelection or retire.  A record of 
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accomplishment and few ethics problems will be met by fewer retirements while a poor record 
will give rise to a greater number of retirements. 
 The three components of the party record—competence, integrity, and ideology—
discussed throughout this text are again used in this chapter to examine the party record as it 
relates to retirements. Both competence and integrity were mentioned by Cox and McCubbins 
(1993) as comprising a ―substantial‖ part of the party record. Beyond this work, these two 
concepts have not been defined in the context of political parties.  Instead, previous research 
focuses on reputations that incumbents have fostered with constituents for these two important 
attributes. Fenno (1978) notes that incumbents attempt to foster reputations of honesty and 
competence in the electorate in order to help reelection prospects.   McCurley and Mondak 
(1995) show that voters respond to individual reputations for integrity, rewarding incumbents 
with their votes, while a reputation for competence produces lower challenger spending, which 
ultimately impacts the vote.  Mondak (1995) extends this research to the congressional district 
level. He finds that competence seems to matter more than integrity for challenger spending, vote 
margin, and strategic retirements.  These previous studies have not examined the impact of party 
reputations, but rather, have merely demonstrated that the important concepts of competence and 
integrity have a significant impact on voting behavior and congressional campaigns.  
 The previous studies describing individual congressional competence usually refer to the 
ability of a member of Congress to accomplish policy goals or perhaps pass legislation. The first 
component I examine is competence.  I posit that a competent political party is one that wins 
legislative battles.  It is able to pass legislation and solve policy problems.  Lebo, McGlynn,and 
Koger (2007) find that as Democratic win rate (the percentage of votes won by Democrats in the 
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House) increases, the percentage of seats in the House picked up by the Democratic Party 
increases.  Minority parties are quick to point out when a majority is caught in the legislative 
doldrums, unable or unwilling to do the work of the people.  The 80
th
 Congress  was famously 
referred to as ―the do nothing congress‖ for its unwillingness or inability to pass legislation.  In 
2006, the minority Democrats repeated this charge against Congressional Republicans, 
highlighting the 109
th
 Congress's lack of a legislative record.  Winning legislative battles 
demonstrates that a party is competent and can govern while intrachamber gridlock leads voters 
to question the ability of the party to govern.   If a party is competent, its members will be less 
likely to retire because their party's record will boost their electoral prospects.     
  The second component examined is integrity. A party with integrity is one that has few 
ethical lapses.  When discussing integrity, scandal, or a lack of integrity by political parties, is 
used.  Scandal has a substantial impact on election results, causing incumbents accused of 
unethical behavior to lose several percentage points from their previous share of the two-party 
vote (Peters and Welch 1980; Alford et al. 1994; Welch and Hibbing 1997; Brown 2006), and the 
impact may be even more pronounced in primary challenges (Brown 2006).  Additionally, 
scandal increases the likelihood that a member of Congress will retire (Carson 2005; Herrick 
2000; 2003; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993).  Political researchers have also tied the House Bank 
scandal to the deluge of retirements in 1992 (Clarke et al. 1999; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994). 
Members of the House accused of scandal appear more electorally vulnerable and thus more 
likely to retire.  Moreover, the impact of scandal taints the reputation of the individual and his 
political party.  Washington Post columnist Mark Shields (1989) recognized this phenomenon 
when he wrote that Barney Frank's (D-MA) relationship with a male prostitute hurt the 
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Democratic Party.  The research conducted in this chapter assumes that House members are 
aware of the reputations in the electorate fostered by their parties. When a party's reputation is 
bad, House members recognize the impact such a reputation can have on their electoral prospects 
and adjust their career calculus accordingly.  I expect that a party record damaged by scandal will 
spur a greater number of retirements.  Before examining aggregate retirements, I first discuss the 
special circumstances surrounding retirements by those who have been accused of scandal. 
 
Scandal and Individual Retirements 
Party leaders, in an effort to control the fallout from a major scandal, may pressure a member of 
Congress to leave the House.   Party leaders pressure unethical members for two reasons.  First, 
as discussed, party leaders have an incentive, the party record and its concomitant impact on 
election results, to encourage the retirement or resignation of ethically wayward party members 
in order to safeguard the party record from further damage due to scandal.  MCs who leave the 
House generate less media attention and damage to the party record than those who stay (an 
assertion I revisit later in this chapter).  Second, party leaders have another, nonpartisan, 
incentive to encourage retirement or resignation. Scandal may harm public trust in Congress as 
an institution. Public trust is essential for the maintenance of the American system of 
government.  Without trust in the system and its institutions, participants in the system will 
become disenchanted and will seek an alternative (Easton 1965).  Bowler and Karp (2004) find 
that public trust of the constituents of MCs involved in the House Bank scandal decreased as the 
number of bad checks written by the Representative increased.  Party leaders may attempt to 
restore public trust by forcing the resignation or retirement of an accused MC.  In this section, I 
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am not able to discern through quantitative means which explanation better fits the motivation 
for party leaders who compel a MC to leave the House. It is reasonable to suggest, however, that, 
because scandal only harms the public trust of the constituents in the Congressional district of 
the accused MC, at least according to Bowler and Karp (2004), party leaders would probably not 
exercise their power to influence the opinions of less than 600,000 people per case (the 
approximate population of a Congressional district in the 2000s).  A party record explanation 
which focuses on preserving the reputation of the entire party, reducing damage to the party 
record, and helping the party‘s electoral fortunes is a better fit for such behavior since it directly 
impacts the goals of each political party and its members.   
There are two ways in which party leaders may pressure members of Congress to leave 
the House—indirect pressure by increasing situational dissatisfaction and direct pressure by 
threatening expulsion. Indirectly, House and party caucus rules work together with the actions of 
party leaders to minimize damage from scandal by promoting retirement.  Moore and Hibbing 
(1998) demonstrate that members of the House are more likely to retire when they are hindered 
from pursuing their goals of reelection, advancement within the House, and making good public 
policy. They call the inability to pursue these goals situational dissatisfaction.  I maintain that 
House and caucus rules, together with actions taken by party leaders, are designed to increase 
situational dissatisfaction for members who are accused of unethical or illegal behaviors.  
Retirement or resignation separates the former member and his or her past behaviors from his or 





Indirect Pressure and Retirement Calculus 
To better understand how situational dissatisfaction affects retirement decisions, I illustrate this 
relationship using Black's (1972) model of political ambition, which models the decision 
calculus for candidates running for city council.  Moore and Hibbing (1998) apply this model to 
House retirement decisions. As stated above, they posit that members of the House are more 
likely to retire if they are having trouble pursuing their goals (situational dissatisfaction). The use 
of Black's model coupled with their theory of situational dissatisfaction is a helpful way to 
illustrate how House and caucus rules, together with the actions of party leaders, can impact the 
retirement decisions of members of Congress accused of scandal.    The retirement calculus, 
taken from Moore and Hibbing (1998), is expressed below: 
Function 3.1:  U = P (Bw) + (1-P)(B1) – C 
U = utility of running for reelection 
P = probability of winning reelection 
Bw = benefits derived from holding office 
B1 = benefits of action undertaken if reelection is not achieved 
C = costs of running for reelection. 
 House and caucus Rules, along with the actions of party leaders, may alter the probability 
of winning reelection (P) and the benefits derived from holding office (Bw).  A description of 
ethics rules and actions taken against members accused of scandal will demonstrate how these 
items impact retirement decisions. Table 3.1 provides a summary of some of the sanctions waged 
on unethical House members and their impact on the retirement calculus.  A check mark under 
the goal indicates that the corresponding punishment hinders the ability of a member of Congress 
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to achieve that goal. The following paragraphs provide a more thorough account of the 
punishments utilized and their relationship with retirement decisions. The benefits derived from 
holding office (Bw) are related to two major goals—making good public policy and advancement 
within the House.  House Rule XXIII provides an automatic punishment for a member convicted 
of a felony for which he or she may receive a sentence of two or more years in prison. Members 
in this situation are stripped of their right to vote on legislation on the floor of the House or in 
committee. However, once the member is reelected, his or her voting rights are restored (Maskell 
2006).  While serving out his or her term, the convicted member will not be able to influence the 
crafting and adoption of public policies with his or her votes in committee or on the floor, 
hindering the member‘s ability to pursue policy goals.  Democratic Caucus rules and Republican 
Conference rules go a step further—they punish those who are merely indicted for felonies in 
which the penalty may include two or more years in prison.  The Republican Conference's Rule 
XXVI calls on a member of the leadership to step down (at least temporarily) if he or she meets 
the criterion mentioned, and Democrats have a similar rule (Maskell 2006). These party rules 
provide an automatic punishment for members of the leadership seriously implicated in illegal 
activities.  Party rules for both the Republican Conference and Democratic Caucus require a 
member convicted of a crime for which the penalty is at least two years in prison to vacate his or 
Table 3.1: Punishments and Their Impact on Member Goals   
   
 P Bw 
Punishment Reelection Making Policy Advancement 
Reprimand    
Censure   
Cannot Vote on Floor    
Removal from Leadership   
Removal of Committee 
Assignment 
  
   
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her leadership position.  Such a punishment impairs the member's ability to hold onto power, 
advance within the House leadership hierarchy, and be involved in the policy process to the 
extent to which he or she was accustomed.  It also prevents any potential battles within the 
caucus to remove the member from his or her position.  In sum, House and party rules provide 
automatic punishments that decrease the benefits of continued service in the House while 
increasing situational dissatisfaction.  
 Additionally, party leaders may, on a case-by-case basis, increase situational 
dissatisfaction with punishment, which impairs the ability of the scandal-plagued member to 
remain in, or advance within the leadership and pursue his or her policy goals. The punishment 
usually doled out in these cases is removal from a chairmanship or a prestige committee 
assignment before an indictment is handed down. I present two cases from the 2006 election to 
illustrate.  Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL), in anticipation of bribery charges being brought 
against Representative Bob Ney (R-OH) in connection with the Jack Abramoff imbroglio, 
pressured Ney to resign his post as Chairman of the House Administration Committee, which 
Ney did (Weisman 2006).  Similarly, then-Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) secured the 
removal of Representative William Jefferson (D-LA) from his seat on the House Ways and 
Means Committee before Jefferson was officially charged with a crime (Murray and Langell 
2006). While not a member of the leadership, he held a seat on one of the so-called power 
committees and would have drawn negative publicity to the Democratic Party at a time when the 
Democrats were accusing the Republicans of being the party of scandal.  Both of these cases 
decreased the benefits of holding office for the MCs involved. Party leaders may also find more 
creative ways to punish members accused of scandal.  Representative Richard Kelly (R-FL) was 
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the only Republican House member implicated in ABSCAM.  He took $25,000 from FBI agents 
and claimed he accepted the payment as part of his own investigation into the matter. The 
Republicans passed a resolution in closed conference which would expel Kelly from the 
Republican Conference if he did not resign from it.  Kelly resigned in a tearful speech on the 
House floor (Lyons 1980).  This method of punishment decreased the benefits derived from 
holding office (he lost his committee assignments), he lost campaign funding from the party's 
campaign committees, decreasing his chances of being reelected, and it distanced the Republican 
Conference from his unethical behavior.  
 Reprimand and censure are two other forms of punishment available in the House. Each 
has been described as a ―public scolding‖ (Moore 1992, 25).  Each form of punishment affects a 
member's probability of reelection (P), showing voters that the allegations of unethical behavior 
leveled at their member of Congress have merit.  Both forms of discipline require two-thirds of 
the House to vote yes for passage. Censure is more serious and requires that the member stand in 
the well of the House floor and be admonished by the Speaker (Moore 1992, 41).  Reprimand is 
a more recent phenomenon, beginning with the case of Representative Robert Sikes (D-FL).  
Both forms of punishment have been used sparingly by the House, and neither has been used in 
the previous decade, save the case of Charlie Rangel (D-NY), despite a plethora of cases in 
which either option could be employed.  Instead, party leaders have taken to stripping away 
committee assignments and chairmanships, letting party and House rules automatically sanction 






Party leaders directly pressure their members to leave the House through the threat of expulsion.  
Expulsion has only been used in a handful of cases—three during the Civil War and two during 
the time period covered in the data set.  Rep. Ozzie Myers (D-PA) was expelled in 1980 for his 
involvement in ABSCAM.  Two decades later, Rep. James Traficant (D-OH) was expelled for 
bribery, racketeering, and numerous other charges. Expulsion requires a two-thirds majority vote, 
and, more often than not, these votes fail.  In fact, out of 29 votes on expulsion since the 
beginning of the House, only five members have been expelled, a success rate of 17.2% (Herrick 
2003).  In the previous two cases, expulsion was used because the member refused to resign.  
More often, party leaders use the threat of expulsion as a means to force resignations rather than 
actually expelling the member. For instance, both Representatives Mario Biaggi (D-NY) and 
Raymond Lederer (D-PA) were threatened with expulsion if they did not resign, and both bowed 
to pressure and resigned (Hook 1988).  Expulsion takes the career decision away from the 
unethical member and puts it in the hands of his colleagues in the House. 
 
The Case of James A. Traficant 
How may party leaders more directly and indirectly encourage a member of Congress to 
retire? The following description of Rep. James A. Traficant‘s (D-OH) expulsion sheds some 
light on this question.  Traficant was one of the three members of the House in the dataset who 
was able to resist calls for resignation—that is, until he was expelled.  Traficant‘s case, although 
different from the others in several respects, presents a good illustration of indirect and direct 
means at work.   
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 James Traficant (D-OH) began the 107
th
 Congress by voting for Representative Dennis 
Hastert (R-IL) for Speaker of the House of Representatives.  Traficant explained that he voted for 
Hastert because of Hastert‘s help with legislation in a previous Congress (Cohn 2001); however, 
Traficant broke one of the cardinal rules of House caucus politics—he voted for the opposing 
party‘s candidate for Speaker (Cox and McCubbins 1994).  Moreover, Traficant voted for the 
majority‘s rules‘ package; he was the only Democrat to do so.  For his votes, Traficant was 
expelled from the Democratic Caucus, and he would spend the rest of his tenure in the House 
calling himself an ‗Independent Democrat.‘  He would serve in the 107
th
 Congress without any 
committee assignments because, as part of his expulsion from the caucus, Democrats took his 
assignments away.  Additionally, he was excluded from caucus activities.  For instance, he was 
not notified about a caucus election for Minority Whip (Foerstel 2001b).  
 Before the 107
th
 began, Traficant was already known as a maverick, often bucking his 
party and voting with the Republicans.  According to a report in CQ Weekly, he voted with the 
Republicans 78% of the time in the 106
th
 Congress (Bettelheim 2001).  He would continue to 
provide headaches for Democrats by voting for the Bush tax cuts and becoming the only 
Democrat to vote with Republicans on a procedural rule that would make it more difficult to pass 
campaign finance legislation (Foerstel 2001c).  
Traficant was indicted on ten charges of corruption on May 4, 2001.  He vehemently 
denied the charges, proclaiming that the indictment was retribution by the Department of Justice 
after Traficant beat RICO charges in the early 1980s.  He elected to defend himself and entered a 
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.  Traficant‘s prospects for reelection seemed bleak.  
Democratic leaders promised to work against Traficant in his bid for reelection by fielding a 
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primary challenger while Republicans also promised to field a challenger for Traficant‘s seat 
(Foerstel 2001a).  Ultimately, Democratic party leaders in the House gave their ―blessing‖ for an 
Ohio redistricting plan by the state legislature, which eliminated Traficant‘s district, initially 
forcing him to run in a district defended by an incumbent (Giroux 2002). 
At his criminal trial, Traficant was ultimately found guilty on all charges.  Minority 
Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) publicly called on Traficant to resign from the House, a 
request Traficant refused (Patrick 2002), while Speaker Dennis Hastert recommended letting the 
ethics process take its course and having the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct launch 
an investigation.  Meanwhile members of both parties introduced resolutions to expel Traficant 
from the House (Nather 2002).   Frank Sensenbrenner (R-WI) introduced a resolution to expel 
Traficant shortly after he was found guilty.  In his concomitant remarks in the Congressional 
Record, Sensenbrenner outlines his reasons for calling for Traficant‘s expulsion:  
Mr. Speaker, I have introduced a resolution expelling the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr.Traficant) from the House of Representatives. Last week, a Federal court jury in 
Cleveland found the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant) guilty on all 10 felony counts 
of a criminal indictment. Regretfully, this resolution is necessary because Mr 
Traficant foolishly rejected the call of the minority leader to resign. Felons belong in jail 
and not in Congress. He has broken the public trust by breaking the law; and if he will 
not voluntarily leave this House, our duty is to remove him. 
Throughout my tenure in the House, I have consistently taken the position that Members 
who have been convicted of felonies should be expelled if they do not resign. In 1980, the 
House expelled Michael Meyers of Pennsylvania after he refused to resign following 
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conviction of Abscam-related felonies. In 1995, Walter Tucker of California was 
convicted, initially refused to resign, and changed his mind after I introduced an 
expulsion resolution. 
Clearly, the expulsion resolutions were an effort to coerce Traficant to resign.  Minority 
Leader Gephardt wanted Traficant gone and if he had been Speaker would probably have let one 
of the resolutions come to the floor for a vote.  Speaker Hastert, however, wanted the Ethics 
Committee to investigate and wait for those results to come back and tabled the expulsion 
resolutions.  Traficant‘s case raises an interesting question—Is the minority party less effective in 
pressuring members to retire?  The majority has a wealth of agenda setting advantages over the 
minority contained in the Speakership and on committees that may allow it to more effectively 
pressure majority party members to retire.  When minority party leaders and majority party 
leaders disagree, then the majority leaders will prevail, ceteris paribus. Traficant appears to 
exemplify just such a case.    After finding Traficant guilty of nine out of ten ethics charges, the 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct unanimously recommended Traficant‘s expulsion 
from the House (Patrick 2002).   The House then proceeded to expel him. 
Traficant‘s case, while an aberration among the cases of scandal I have identified 
(because he was kicked out of the House Democratic Party yet still caucused with them prior to 
the breaking of his scandal), shows many of the tools available to party leaders to pressure a 
member of the House to retire or resign.  Democratic leaders ran a primary challenger against 
Traficant and promoted a redistricting plan which eliminated his seat in Ohio.  After his 
conviction, Traficant was forbidden from voting on the floor of the House.  In most cases, a 
member of Congress threatened with expulsion would probably retire.  In Traficant‘s case, he 
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was a particularly eccentric, hard-headed, and perhaps delusional individual.
9
  Moreover, he 
caucused with the minority party and a disagreement between the Speaker and the minority 
leader may have extended Traficant‘s tenure in the House by a few months. Traficant may not be 
the best choice for a model that uses utility maximization as a decision rule; however, his story 
provides a rare, public look at how party leaders may pressure an individual to retire or resign, 
even though those attempts were unsuccessful. 
  
A Model of Individual Scandal Retirements 
Do the direct and indirect methods available to party leaders actually increase the propensity to 
retire? I estimate a logistic model of individual retirements for the 155 members of the House 
accused of scandal between 1968 and 2008 to answer this question.  Scandals include allegations 
of breaking the law or violating House ethics rules.  As explained in Chapter 2, I use Herrick 
(2003), the Washington Post, and Congressional Quarterly Almanacs to identify scandals.   
There are three independent variables of interest included in the model.  The first variable 
is Party Pressure.  This is a dummy variable, coded 1 if it is reported in the Washington Post that 
a member of Congress was directly pressured by party leaders to leave the House and 0 
otherwise.  It is possible that other members were directly pressured by the leadership to leave 
the House and that these occurrences were not reported in the Washington Post. This is the 
primary drawback to the approach taken here.  Additionally, the majority party may be better 
able to directly pressure a member to leave the House, so I have included the interaction term 
Party Pressure*Majority.  Punish is a dummy variable coded 1 if the MC was punished and 0 
                                                 
9
 He was a famously eccentric House member who was known to wear denim suits and take on populist causes. The 
conclusion that he could be delusion is reached because he claimed that the Department of Justice was ‗after 
him‘ for retribution for an earlier charge that he had beat in 1985. 
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otherwise. Punishments are actions taken by the House, party, or party leaders that impede the 
member‘s goals. Included in this list is censure, reprimand, removal from a committee, removal 
of a committee chairmanship, having to step down from a party position, and the inability to 
engage in committee work or vote on the House floor.  Punish was constructed using information 
from Herrick (2003), Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (2004), Congressional 
Quarterly Almanacs, and the Washington Post.  I hypothesize that each variable increases the 
propensity of ethically-challenged members of Congress to retire.  
 I include several personal variables from the literature on Congressional retirements.  Age 
is associated with an increased propensity to retire (Brace 1985; Hibbing 1982; Kiewiet and 
Zeng 1993; Livingston and Friedman 1993; Moore and Hibbing 1992; 1998).  I use the accused 
member‘s age at the beginning of the first session of the Congress in which the scandal occurred.  
Electoral Vulnerability is also associated with an increased probability of retirement (Brace 
1985; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993).  This measure is often based on prior electoral performance.  The 
two-party vote in the previous election is used for this variable. Redistrict is a dummy variable, 1 
if the district was redrawn since the previous election, 0 otherwise.   I also include a dummy 
variable called Guilty, coded 1 for a conviction of a crime or misdemeanor and 0 otherwise.  
Brown (2006) finds that moral scandals are more damaging than money scandals, so I include a 
dummy variable called Moral Scandal--coded 1 if a moral scandal, 0 if a money scandal.  Those 
in the majority should be less likely to retire.  Majority is coded 1 if part of the majority party, 0 
otherwise.  Finally, Republicans are known to have higher retirement rates on average than 
Democrats.  Democrat is dummy variable, coded 1 if a Democrat and 0 for Republicans.  
Democrat should be negatively associated with the probability of retirement. 
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Results from logistic regression of retirements are given in Table 3.2.
10
  The interaction term 
Party Pressure*Majority was dropped from the analysis because majority party members always 
retire when pressured by party leaders while minority party members never retire when pressured 
by party leaders.   Only Guilty and Party Pressure attain significance.  With all variables held at 
their means, the probability of retirement is 53% if the ethically-challenged MC is pressured by 
party leaders.   The probability of retirement is 31% if found guilty of a felony or misdemeanor.   
If the member is both found guilty of a felony or misdemeanor and he or she is pressured to 





Table 3.2: Logistic Regression of House Scandal Retirements, 1970-2008 
 
Age     0.0053 
 (0.0235) 
Party Pressure         1.9903* 
 (0.8379) 




Majority         0.9097 
 (0.7341) 
Democrat         -0.7558 
 (0.5409) 
Electoral Vulnerability     -0.0111 
 (0.0164) 





Wald χ2 22.74, p>0.0037 
Log Likelihood Ratio -62.78 
  
Note: p <0.05*, estimated with robust standard errors 
                                                 
10
 I also estimated a model of retirements using Rare Events Logistic Regression (King and Zeng 2001).  Since there 
are few retirements in comparison to the number of members running for reelection, it makes sense that 
retirements are treated as relatively rare events.  Rare Events Logistic Regression corrects the coefficients to 
account for the discrepancy between retirements and running for reelection.  Using this model, however, did not 
change the significance of any of the variables.   
11




 While not significant, the sign for Punish indicates that punishments decrease the 
propensity to retire.  While technically punishments imposed by the House should increase 
situational dissatisfaction, it does not lead to retirement.  The desire to retain their seats in the 
House is strong, stronger than the detrimental impact that a punishment may have on their goals. 
 The results confirm that party pressure is a significant cause of retirement.  But because 
of the discrepancy in the procedural powers of the majority and minority parties, only the 
majority party leaders are effective at pressuring members to retire or resign.   Indirect pressure 
through situational dissatisfaction is not strong enough to compel a member to quit the House.  
The results show that party leaders take scandal and its potential damage on the party record and 
the institution of Congress seriously.  They are willingly to potentially sacrifice a seat or two in 
the next election to safeguard their party‘s reputation for integrity. 
 When party leaders are successful at compelling a member of Congress to leave the 
House, is damage to the party record reduced?  In Chapter 2, I created a measure of aggregate 
negative integrity based on the evening news stories on ABC, CBS, and NBC generated by the 
scandals of each party.  I estimate a negative binomial regression model in Table 3.3 of evening 
news stories attributed to each individual MC‘s scandals. Moral Scandal is a dichotomous 
variable indicating a moral versus a money scandal (Brown 2006).  Moral Scandal should 
generate more evening news stories.  Guilty is a dummy variable, 1 if guilty of a felony or 
misdemeanor and 0 otherwise.  If a member is found guilty of a crime, he or she will have more 
news stories attributed to the scandal.   Retire is a dummy variable, 1 if the member retired or 
resigned and 0 otherwise.  Party Pressure is a dummy variable, 1 if the MC was pressured by 
party leaders to retire or resign and 0 otherwise.  The independent variable of interest is the 
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interaction term Party Pressure * Retire.  If a member is pressured and he retires, then he should 
generate fewer evening news stories.   
The Likelihood Ratio test of alpha indicates that negative binomial is the preferred 
estimation technique over Poisson.   All the variables, save Retire, are significant and in the 
expected direction.  Importantly, the independent variable of interest, Party Pressure*Retire is 
significant at the 0.05 level.  With all variables held at their means, when a member of Congress 
is pressured by party leaders to retire and he stays in the House, then the model predicts 41 news 
stories attributable to his scandal.  If, however, he does bow to pressure and quits the House, then 
the model predicts only 3 news stories attributable to his or her scandal.  While the dependent 
variable here is not identical to the aggregate variable used to measure negative integrity, it is 
used to create that variable, and a reduction in individual scandal stories would reduce the 
aggregate negative integrity measure.  From the analysis above, I conclude that party leaders, if 
successful in their attempts at pressuring a party member to retire, can significantly decrease 
Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Regression of Evening News Stories, 1970-2008 
 












Party Pressure 1.9028** 
 
(0.7268) 












Likelihood Ratio test α=0 χ2 = 1500.72, p>0.000 
  
      Note: p<0.05*, p< 0.01**, estimated with robust standard errors  
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potential damage to the party record. In the next section, I provide a direct test of the party record 
on aggregate retirements.        
 
Model Variants of Aggregate Retirement 
There are three distinct model variants of party record induced retirements.  These three models, 
like those discussed in Chapter 2, are focused on the role of p in Function 3.1.  While the results 
of Chapter 2 have revealed that Model Variant F, which showed that all challengers are affected 
by both challenger and incumbent party records, is the best way to characterize the relationship 
between the party record and challenger entry, the relationship between the party record and 
retirements still remains unexamined.  Each model variant offers a different role for incumbent 
and potential challenger party records.    
 
Model Variant A: Retirements with Incumbent's Party Record only 
In this model, only the incumbent's party's record affects p.  A good party record should 
increase p while a bad party record should decrease p.  The incumbent is only examining what 
his party has done and is not concerned with the reputation of a potential challenger's party.  
Incumbents will be more apt to retire when the record is bad and less likely when it is good.  
This model variant follows the traditional view of the party record in which only incumbents 
receive an electoral benefit from their party.   
 In Model A, party leaders are focused on improving the party records for their incumbent 
members.  Party leaders realize that the chances of retaining or gaining control of the House are 
affected by the retirement decisions of their members. Open seats are more difficult to defend 
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than seats held by an incumbent.  With this view in mind, party leaders will attempt to provide an 
easier path to reelection for their members by generating a good party record.        
 
Model Variant B: Retirements with Potential Challenger's Party Record only 
In this model, incumbents are solely focused on the impact of a potential challenger's 
party record.   Incumbents, evaluating their reelection chances, are more likely to retire when the 
challenger‘s party has a good record. 
 In Model B, party leaders still try to generate good party records.  They do so, however, 
to provide a more difficult path to reelection for members of the opposing party.   By doing so, 
they influence the p term in each representative‘s retirement calculus.  An increase in the number 
of retirements from the opposing party creates more open seats which are easier to win than 
those guarded by an incumbent.   This helps the party in its goal of gaining or maintaining 
majority status.  
  
Model Variant C:  Retirements with Incumbent's Party Record and Potential Challenger's Party 
Record 
In this model, both the incumbent's party record and the potential challenger's party 
record affect the decision to retire.  A poor party record from the incumbent's party coupled with 
a strong party record from potential challenger's party could hurt the chances that the incumbent 
will be reelected. As a result, when the potential challenger's party record is substantially ―better‖ 
than the incumbent's party record, the incumbent will be more likely to retire.  When the 
incumbent's party record is substantially ―better‖ than the potential challenger's party record, he 
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will be less likely to retire.    
In Model C, party leaders improve their parties‘ records for a number of reasons.  First, 
they improve or safeguard the record in order to provide an electoral benefit for their incumbent 
members.  By doing so, they decrease the likelihood that members of their party will retire.  
Retirements create open seats which are usually more difficult for a party to defend while seats 
held by incumbents are, ceteris paribus, easier to defend and help the party gain or maintain 
majority status.    Second, by improving the party record, party leaders are making it more 
difficult for incumbents of the opposing party to win reelection.  Incumbents of the opposing 
party are more likely to retire under these circumstances, creating more open seats which are 
easier to win than seats held by incumbents, ceteris paribus.  Put more succinctly, gains in the 
party record help the incumbents‘ party by decreasing the probability of retirement while also 
hurting the opposing incumbents‘ party by increasing the probability of retirement.  
 
Rationality and a Critique of the Models 
The previous research on Congressional retirements assumes that House members are rational, 
utility-maximizers, concerned primarily with reelection and secondarily about advancement in 
the House and making good public policy.  Political scientists treat explanations about ―spending 
more time with family‖ with skepticism and perhaps cynicism.  Politicians are not necessarily 
known for their candor, and political scientists are right to be skeptical about official 
explanations for retirements.  Politicians are people, too (Jones 2009).  In some cases, official 
explanations for retirements may contain at least a morceau of truth, and their retirements are not 
strategic, but they are instead based on personal reasons.  The models presented here cannot 
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account for retirements that are based on family issues, illness, and most other matters that do not 
involve strategic calculation related to Congress. Not all behavior can be captured by rational 
choice models (Monroe 1991), and incumbent career decisions are by no means an exception to 
this rule.          
 
Data and Methods 
The dependent variable is the percentage of the Democratic caucus that resigns or retires each 
Congress called the Democratic Retirement Rate (DRR).  Retirements are voluntary departures 
where the incumbent serves out the remainder of his or her term.  Resignations are departures 
where the incumbent immediately quits the House and does not serve out the remainder of his or 
her term.  Some MCs retire in order to run for higher office—Governor or Senate—these 
retirements are not included in DRR. 
 Integrity is one key component of the party record.  In Chapter 2, I created a measure of 
negative integrity based on television evening news coverage of each party‘s scandals.  I also 
provided a critique of this measure and found support for the validation of negative integrity.  In 
Chapter 2, I modified negative integrity in order to account for the timing of challenger entry 
decisions.  While the decision to retire or resign can be made at any time during a Congress, I 
make the assumption that these decisions, by and large, are made within the first few months of 
the second session of each Congress.  I, therefore, use only evening news stories shown during 
the first session of each Congress for negative integrity.  Also, just like in Chapter 2, it is the 
difference between Democratic and Republican Negative Integrity that is used, called 
Democratic Negative Integrity Advantage (DNIA). 
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 In addition to integrity, competence is also examined.  Competent parties are able to win 
legislative battles.  Democratic Party Win Rate is the percentage of the time that Democrats win 
votes in the House.  Following Lebo and O‘Geen (2011), the variable is lagged by one Congress.  
Democratic President Win Rate is the percentage of votes in which House Democrats support a 
President of the same party.  It is lagged by one Congress.  
 The two ideological variables identified by Woon and Pope (2008) are also included in 
the model of DRR.  Polarization is the distance between the DW-NOMINATE scores of the two 
parties‘ median voters.  DHA is Democratic Heterogeneity Advantage and is the difference 
between Democratic and Republican DW-NOMINATE score standard deviations for each 
Congress. More homogenous parties should be associated with an electoral advantage.   As the 
heterogeneity advantage increases, DRR should also increase.    
National tide variables include Presidential Approval and Income which is the natural log 
of income in the first year of each Congress.  Presidential Approval is the president‘s approval 
rating in the Gallup Poll in December of each odd numbered year. Presidential Approval is 
multiplied by -1 when there is a Republican President.
12
  Presidential Approval should 
negatively impact DRR.  A dummy variable is also included for a Democratic President, coded 1 
for a Democratic President and 0 otherwise.   The natural log of income per capita in 2008 
dollars from the first year of each Congress is used as an indicator of economic performance.  
When there is a Republican President, Income is multiplied by -1.  As Income increases, DRR 
should decrease.  
I also included two additional variables from the retirement literature.  Age is the average 
age of the Democratic caucus at the start of each Congress.  This measure is taken from analysis 
                                                 
12 This practice is taken from Jacobson (1989). 
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by the Wall Street Journal Online.
13
 I have also included a dummy variable called 1992.  The 
abnormal circumstances concerning the 1992 election warrant the inclusion of such a variable.  
1992 was the last year that some MCs could take advantage of a legislative loophole that allowed 
them to pocket money left over from their reelection campaign funds if they chose to retire. 1992 
was also the year in which voters had the opportunity to penalize House members involved in 
check kiting using their House Bank accounts. It is expected that the dummy variable for 1992 
will increase DRCC, ceteris paribus.    
Figure 3.1 shows Democratic (DRR) and Republican (RRR) Retirement Rates from 1970-
2008.  The period of highest retirement for Democrats was the 1990s, a period during which the 
House Bank scandal occurred and Republicans took control of the House.  There is also a spike 
in Democratic retirements in 1978, continuing into 1980, peaks that correspond to Koreagate and 
ABSCAM.  Republican retirements peaked in advance of the 2008 election in which Democrats 
extended the size of their majority by an additional 21 seats.  Democrats have an average 
retirement rate of 5.3% while Republicans have a slightly higher average rate of 6.2%,  
supporting Gilmour and Rothstein‘s (1993) observation that Republicans retire at a higher rate 
than Democrats. 
Table 3.4 presents the results of Ordinary Least Squares regression on Democratic 
Retirement Rate.
14
  Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
Democratic Retirement Rate as well as Age are unit roots.  I take first differences of each of these  
                                                 
13
 Average age may be found at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-
CONGRESS_AGES_1009.html 
14
  Alternatively, I could have used the difference between Democratic and Republican Retirement Rates as a 
dependent variable (Wolak 2007).  I estimated a model with the alternative dependent variable, but it did not 




Figure 3.1: Democratic and Republican Retirement Rates, 1970-2008 
two variables.
15
 The model shows that only 1992 is significant.  The peculiar circumstances of 
the 1992 election are well-documented.  1992 was the last year that some MCs could take 
advantage of a legislative loophole that allowed them to pocket surplus campaign donations.  It 
was also the election following the House Bank Scandal in which the press discovered that 
hundreds of members of each party had written bad checks using their House Bank accounts.  
The unique circumstances of 1992 increased the retirement rate by 13 percentage points.  None 
of the model variants described earlier fit the results of OLS regression on DRR.   Instead, party 
record variables do not have a statistically significant impact on retirements. Results from the 
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test indicate that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no autocorrelation between the lags.  The Dickey-Fuller test performed on the residual 
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Δln(Income)       32.5656 
 
(23.4299) 
Democratic President    4.9819 
 
(8.6720) 
Presidential Approval       -0.0698 
 
(0.0851) 












1992       13.0521* 
 
(3.8691) 




Adjusted R2 0.31 
Breusch-Godfrey LM χ2=0.043, p>0.8351 
Durbin-Watson d 1.947 
Dickey-Fuller test for  unit root -4.173, p>0.0007 
  
   Note: p<0.05* 
indicates that I can reject the null hypothesis that there is a unit root.  Finally, results from the 
Shapiro-Wilk W test show that the residuals are normally distributed.    
Like in Chapter 2, I also estimated an alternative model with Democrat President Win 
Rate, but the inclusion of this variable did not change the findings presented here, so I do not 
present those results here.   
 The results in Table 3.3 are not all that surprising considering the findings from the 
Chapter 2 regarding quality challengers and the findings earlier this chapter regarding situational 
dissatisfaction.  Put simply, the value of a House seat and its concomitant benefits are high for 
those who possess them.  That is why punishments did not seem to affect the propensity to retire 
among those who are accused of scandal in the logistic regression model of individual scandal 
retirements estimated earlier in this chapter.  Members of Congress will fight tooth and nail to 
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retain their seats once they have them.  The perceived impact of the party record on reelection is 
not large enough to persuade members of Congress to vacate their seats.  It was also not large 
enough to persuade quality challengers to challenge an incumbent.  It is only when MCs think 
they will lose or will be expelled that they leave the House.  The impact of the party record is 
simply too small to influence House retirement decisions. 
 
Conclusion 
The results of statistical analysis of retirements show that the party record‘s impact on the 
retirement calculus, if there is one, is too small to influence departures from Congress.  The value 
of a House seat is simply too high to overcome the small loss in reelection probability that may 
be associated with a bad party record or the small gain in reelection probability associated with a 
good party record.  The desire to stay or leave Congress is simply unaffected by the party record, 
at least in the aggregate.   
 I find that pressure from party leaders significantly increases the probability of 
retirement.  Party leaders have two reasons for pressuring a member to leave Congress—scandal 
both decreases public trust in Congress as an institution and it harms the party record. I could not 
distinguish between these two reasons for party pressure in the model I estimated for scandal 
retirements; rather, I only showed that party pressure is a significant cause of ―voluntary‖ 
departures from the House.   The majority party, because of its advantages, seems more effective 
at pressuring party members to leave then the minority party does.  An interaction term, however, 
could not be estimated in the logistic regression model because members of the majority who are 
pressured always leave the House, and members of the minority never leave the House.  It seems 
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that being in the majority is a necessary, but not a sufficient cause, for those who are pressured to 
leave the House. 
 In sum, at the individual party leaders may pressure MCs to leave the House if they 
damage public trust and/or harm the party record, and that pressure is effective at compelling 
them to depart.  The party record and national tides do not impact aggregate retirements. Most 
departures from the House occur due to retirement or resignation, so the study of retirements is 
an important research endeavor.  A partisan model of voluntary departures does not do a very 
good job explaining why House members choose to vacate their seats.  It may be that non-
partisan models of retirements better explain aggregate departures from the House than a partisan 
approach. 
 Political parties may provide a vehicle through which collective responsibility may occur, 
but they are not able to achieve, through aggregate retirements, collective responsibility.  It 
seems that the most important way in which members leave the House cannot be explained 
through partisan collective responsibility, but rather some other predictors must exist that explain 
these decisions.           
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Chapter 4: The Party Record in Elections 
 
Representative Barney Frank hired a male escort to serve as his housekeeper, an escort whom 
Frank had previously paid for sex.  The escort-turned-housekeeper did not give up prostitution.  
In fact, he began running a prostitution ring out of Representative Frank's home, unbeknownst to 
Frank.  After discovering the illegal activities of his employee, Frank asked the House Ethics 
committee to look into the matter.  Many House members within both the Democratic and 
Republican parties called on Frank to be censured, and some on the Republican side, called for 
him to be expelled.  Instead, Frank was reprimanded, a rebuke from the House similar to censure 
except that Frank did not have to stand in the well of the House as the statement of chastisement 
was read.  In the hullabaloo that followed, Barney Frank was able to weather the storm.  Despite 
a great deal of negative news coverage and calls for his expulsion, Frank ran for reelection and 
won.  The Frank incident prompted columnist Mark Shields (1989) to comment in his column 
that Barney Frank had hurt his political party. 
Shields‘ column suggests that the impact of the Frank scandal had effects that 
reverberated beyond the legislative career of Barney Frank.  This scandal had harmed the 
Democratic Party and its members.  Put another way, Frank‘s actions hurt not only his individual 
reputation but the reputation of the entire House Democratic Party.  Shield suggests that the 
American people associate the actions of an individual with a political party.  If American voters 
take the reputation of political parties into account when they cast their ballots, then political 
parties offer a way for voters to hold members of Congress collectively responsible through the 
party system.  
 The idea of collective responsibility for the actions of several or even one member of 
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Congress, like Barney Frank, through political parties is not unique to Shields' column.  Indeed, 
Fiorina (1980) believes collective responsibility through political parties is critical to a 
democratic form of government.  As described in previous chapters, many political scientists, 
have posited that Congressional parties have collective reputations that may aid in the 
achievement of collective responsibility.  Perhaps the best exposition of this idea comes from 
Cox and McCubbins (1993; 2005) and their notion of the party record, an image of the party that 
can be improved or hurt by parties, their members, and the actions of party leaders.    
 Although the notion of a collective party image is not new, the party record that Cox and 
McCubbins discuss has received scant attention by political scientists with the exceptions of 
Lebo and O‘Geen (2011), Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007), and Woon and Pope (2008).  
Previous literature has not thoroughly examined the impact of the party record on election 
outcomes.   In this chapter, I attempt to correct this deficit by examining how changes in the 
party record affect Congressional elections.
 
 
Party Government and the Party Record  
Perhaps the biggest debate in contemporary Congressional organization literature centers on 
political parties, particularly the role of parties in the House of Representatives.  Congressional 
researchers have published several studies demonstrating support for the notion that political 
parties play a large role in determining policy outcomes, largely through agenda setting (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993; 2005; Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995).  Krehbiel (1991; 1998)  has led the charge 
for alternatives, positing informational and pivotal politics theories, to challenge the partisan 
models that have largely dominated theories of Congressional organization for the past twenty 
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years.  A critical component of one of these models of the cartel theory of party government is 
the party record.  Results from empirical analysis that suggest that the party record contributes to 
the electoral success or losses of a party's candidates can provide additional support for a key 
notion in a major theory of parties in Congress while a null finding may suggest that cartel 
theory may need to be revised.  
   Cox and McCubbins (1993; 2005) assert that the majority party in the House of 
Representatives operates as a cartel, monopolizing the agenda, and acting to solve collective 
action dilemmas, such as passing legislation and reelecting its members.  Political parties have 
six goals— control of agenda powers, making good public policy, improving the party record, 
reelecting party members to the House, gaining or maintaining a majority, and reelecting party 
leaders into their positions (2005; 8).  The majority party, in pursuit of these goals, structures the 
House to keep from being rolled on the floor of the House of Representatives.  This is the notion 
of negative agenda power in which majority party veto players block bills that are opposed by 
the majority of the majority party from reaching the floor of the House.  As Cox and McCubbins 
point out, their theory is compatible with another party government theory, Conditional Party 
Government.  Under Conditional Party Government (CPG), party leaders are given greater 
powers to pursue a positive agenda under two conditions—when the caucus is relatively 
homogeneous in ideological preferences and the parties are polarized in their preferences (Rohde 
1991; Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 1998; 2000). CPG is a theory of party behavior that 
explains arm twisting on the floor of the House and positive agenda setting.  Cartel theory, on the 
other hand, focuses on the efforts of parties before a bill reaches the floor for final passage and 
negative agenda powers.    
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 Cartel theory and CPG differ in the goals maximized.  CPG focuses exclusively on the 
policy goals parties and their caucus members pursue while parties, according to the cartel 
model, act to get their members reelected as well as make good public policy (Smith 2000).  Cox 
and McCubbins explicitly discuss the public records of political parties and assert that these 
records matter for electoral politics.  In fact, they point out that cartel theory ―depends crucially 
on the premise that the party record has at least a noticeable impact on the reelection 
probabilities of [party] members‖ (1993, 120).   This chapter asks the following question: Do the 
actions of congressional parties and the reputations they develop affect election outcomes?   
    Cox and McCubbins (1993) demonstrate that the congressional vote does move in 
swings that favor members of one party over the other, providing evidence of a collective vote 
relationship between party members.  Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007) make further strides 
toward evaluating and explaining the concept of the party record. Their Strategic Party  
Government (SPG) model emphasizes the electoral effects of party unity voting. In their paper, 
they find that increased partisanship negatively impacts Democratic seat share in the House, and 
a higher majority party win rate on the floor of the House, when the Democrats are in the 
majority, leads to better election returns for Democrats. Woon and Pope (2008), in contrast to 
these  other two studies, find that party labels matter more for challengers than incumbents, 
challenging the view put forth by Cox and McCubbins that the actions of Congressional parties 
can positively affect the reelection prospects of their members.  
 While Cox and McCubbins (1993), Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007), and Woon and 
Pope (2008) have partially evaluated the collective electoral relationship that exists between 
members of Congress who share a political affiliation, more work is needed.  In particular, these 
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studies have not examined integrity as a component of the party record, nor have they examined 
more than one component in the same study. 
 
Determinants of Individual Election Results 
Political scientists have identified a number of factors that contribute to the success or failure of 
the reelection efforts of House incumbents.  Incumbent quality can help or hurt a House 
member‘s prospects for reelection.  McCurley and Mondak (1995) and Mondak (1995) use the 
Congressional biographies in the Almanac of American Politics to come up with incumbent 
quality scores, measuring quality across two dimensions--competence and integrity.  Using data 
from the National Election Studies, McCurley and Mondak (1995) find that both competence and 
integrity influence individual vote choice. Incumbents with low levels of competence and 
integrity have a decreased probability of voting for the incumbent.  Mondak (1995) finds that 
incumbents with reputations for low levels of integrity but high levels of competence are more 
likely to be reelected.  Put another way, a highly competent but morally questionable incumbent 
is more likely to be reelected than his peers who have higher levels of integrity.  It seems that 
bending or breaking the rules may be helpful in a reelection campaign if an incumbent possesses 
the ability to not get caught.  
 While McCurley and  Mondak are concerned with two dimensions of candidate quality, 
another thread of research focuses exclusively on integrity.  Accusations of unethical behavior or 
scandal are associated with a 5 to 11 percentage point decline in the percentage of the two-party 
vote garnered by an incumbent in his or her bid for reelection (Brown 2006; Peters and Welch 
1980; Welch and Hibbing 1997).  In 1992, allegations surfaced that the majority of House 
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members wrote bad checks using their House Bank accounts.  As a result, some of the worst 
check kiters failed to win their bids for reelection (Alford et al. 1994).   Moreover, those accused 
of scandal are less likely to survive the next two election cycles.  They are either expelled, retire, 
or fail to win reelection (Herrick 2000).    
 In addition to incumbent quality, an incumbent's responsiveness to his or her constituency 
is also an important factor for a successful reelection bid.  Paying attention to the needs of one's 
constituency can be vital for an incumbent.  Both pork barrel spending and case work are key 
elements in the incumbency advantage and ultimately reelection (Fiorina 1977; King 1991; 
Mayhew 1974b).  Successfully helping constituents navigate through the labyrinthine maze of 
federal agencies can help win over voters for the next election.  In his exhaustive biography of 
Lyndon Johnson's years in the House, Caro (1990) describes the enormous emphasis Johnson 
placed on constituent service.  His staff had to answer all incoming constituent mail the day that 
it came into the office.  Moreover, Johnson, himself, spent a great deal of time learning the ins 
and outs of the federal bureaucracy, making contacts within each agency, in order to secure 
favorable resolutions to constituent problems.  With no offense to the efforts of Lyndon Johnson, 
Mann and Wolfinger (1980), through their analysis of NES data, find that a good reputation for 
handling case work is more important for constituent evaluations of their incumbent MC than the 
case work itself.    
 Of course, case work alone cannot win elections.  Incumbents also attempt to bring home 
the bacon.  In the most recent Congress (112th Congress), efforts have been made to curb the 
inclusion of pork barrel projects in legislation, but for decades members of Congress and their 
constituents have relied on pork barrel spending projects to boost their incumbency advantage 
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(Mayhew 1974b).  While the recent efforts to halt pork barrel spending originate with the 
Republican-controlled House, both parties have used pork as a way to help win over or reward 
key constituencies and pursue policy goals, though each party may pursue different forms of 
pork to accomplish these ends (Bickers and Stein 2000).   Not only are individual House 
members concerned with pork, but parties within Congress utilize the distribution of pork to help 
vulnerable members win reelection and to compensate them for an uncomfortable vote in which 
they supported the party's position when it may hurt them electorally (Carroll and Kim 2010). 
 Along with the more direct distributional benefits from pork and case work,  House 
incumbents are also mindful of the partisan and policy preferences of their constituents.  House 
incumbents are individuals with their own policy preferences (Jones 2009; Rothernberg and 
Sanders 2000); however, they may shift their roll call behavior to approximate the policy 
positions of their constituents (Miller and Stokes 1963).  The median voter theorem predicts that 
candidates for elected office will attempt to align their positions with the voters who elect them 
in order to win their votes in the next election (Downs 1957).  For example, examining the 
Reagan defense build-up in the early 1980s, Bartels (1991) finds that members whose 
constituents favored increased spending were more likely to vote for more spending in fiscal 
years 1981 and 1982.  Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold, and Zorn (1997) provide another example 
with their examination of the timing of position taking regarding ratification of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  They find that both district unionization rates and 
campaign contributions from unions increased the speed with which members of Congress took a 
public position on NAFTA.   Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001), on the other hand, find 
little evidence that House candidates alter their positions to fit the preferences of their 
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constituents.  Only in competitive districts does candidate behavior match the expectations of the 
median voter theorem.   
 Members of Congress respond to policy preferences of their constituents because they 
fear the electoral consequences of ignoring those preferences.  Indeed, analysis of patterns of roll 
call behavior by political scientists shows that there is good reason for their fear.  Members of 
Congress who vote out of sync with their constituents' preferences may find themselves out of a 
job after the next election (Ansolabehere and Jones 2010).  In his seminal analysis of the 
relationship between roll calls and incumbent reelection, Erickson (1971) finds that House 
Republicans with extreme voting records get fewer votes; however, this relationship does not 
hold true for Democrats.  Both Erickson (1971) and Canes-Wrone et al (2002) show that 
ideological extremity is associated with electoral loss.  While these scholars claim that 
ideological extremity hurts an incumbent's reelection prospects, others claim that voting with 
one's party can also be problematic for incumbents.  Carson et al (2010) maintain that ideological 
extremity is not the culprit responsible when scholars examine roll call patterns and electoral 
loss; instead, a pattern of supporting one's party is to blame for electoral loss.  Using fixed-
effects panel data models that incorporate both ideology and party unity, Carson et al. find that 
party unity, not ideological extremity is associated with electoral loss. 
 The determinants of electoral outcomes discussed to this point deal primarily with factors 
that are under the control of the incumbent. Of course, not all factors are under the control of the 
incumbent.  As discussed in Chapter 2, challengers make the decision to enter a House race or 
not, and the quality of the challengers can mean the difference between losing and winning a race 
(Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Jacobson 1989).  Quality challengers better understand how to 
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campaign and how to win an election.  Part of the process of campaigning involves raising and 
spending significant sums of campaign cash.  Examining the 1984 and 1986 House elections, 
Abramowitz (1991) finds a strong negative relationship between challenger spending and 
incumbent's margin of victory over the challenger.     
 
Determinants of Aggregate Election Results 
While there is a multitude of individual and district level factors that influence election results, 
such as challenger quality and spending, scholars have also concluded that several aggregate 
level variables influence election results as well.  Analysis of these variables has been conducted 
using aggregate level dependent variables such as the normal vote (Tufte 1975) or seat change 
(Oppenheimer et al 1986).   
Successful presidential candidates often help down ballot candidates win.  Presidential 
coattails help bring friendly partisans to the House with whom the newly elected President can 
work on legislation.  The coattail effect accounts for a substantial amount of the variation in 
aggregate election results during presidential election years (Campbell 1986).  Moreover, 
coattails have been described as a surge and decline phenomenon with the President's party 
gaining seats during Presidential elections and losing seats during midterm elections (Campbell 
1960, but see Campbell 1987 for an update). 
Almost without fail, the President‘s party loses seats each midterm election (Campbell 
1960; Tufte 1975; Campbell 1986; Erickson 1988). Recently, however, the near perfect negative 
relationship between seat loss and belonging to the president's party has been less consistent. The 
president's party actually gained seats in both the 1998 and 2002 midterm elections.  These 
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elections are likely due to extreme political circumstances, the Clinton impeachment 
(Abramowitz 2001) and the attacks of September 11
th
 and the subsequent War on Terror 
(Jacobson 2003).  Historically, though, being part of the President's party in midterm elections is 
a strong predictor of seat loss, and recent midterms have shown a return to this pattern of seat 
loss with Democrats picking up 31 seats from 2004 to 2006 and Republicans picking up 61 seats 
from 2008 to 2010. 
The nationalization of House elections can produce large changes in the number of seats 
held by each party.  As mentioned previously, salient national political issues, such as the War on 
Terrorism and the impeachment of President Clinton, can help determine a party‘s electoral 
success or failure in the next election (Abramowitz 2001; Jacobson 2003).  In the case of the 
Clinton impeachment, voters punished Republicans for overreaching and going after Clinton.  
The backlash against impeachment was the most important determinant of the Republican failure 
to pick up seats in 1998 (Abramowitz 2001).  In the 1994 midterm election, House Republicans 
intentionally nationalized the election, tying House Democrats to the political mishaps of the 
Clinton Administration and blaming them for legislative gridlock.   They also produced a 
positive policy program alternative, their Contract with America, but its impact on the election 
was probably minimal (Jacobson 1996).  House Republicans, through their nationalization of the 
election, won a majority of seats in 1994 for the first time in 40 years.    
 Many Congressional election scholars explain the nationalization of House elections as a 
referendum on the President, Congress, and each political party (Kernell and Jacobson 1983; 
Tufte 1975; 1978).  In 2006, House Democrats were successfully able to tie majority House 
Republicans to an unpopular President and criticize them for their lack of legislative 
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productivity.  House Democrats won a majority of seats for the first time in 12 years (Jacobson 
2007).  The aggregate referendum model has been described as similar to Fiorina's individual 
model of retrospective voting (Marra and Ostrom 1989).  Throughout this text, I have referred to 
aggregate referendum models as national tide models.  The referendum scholars have found that 
presidential approval impacts seat change.  A popular president can help the electoral fortunes of 
his party while an unpopular president can hurt his party's candidates.  Several scholars have 
demonstrated that strong presidential approval can boost a party's prospects during the election 
(Tufte 1975; Newman and Ostrom 2002).   For instance, high approval of President Ronald 
Reagan and good economic growth helped House Republicans only lose five seats in the 1986 
midterm elections (Jacobson and Kernell 1990).  In contrast to 1986, President George W. Bush‘s 
low approval ratings during the 2006 midterm elections, largely due to disapproval over his 
handling of the war in Iraq, helped Democrats take control of the House (Jacobson 2007).  
Likewise, President Bill Clinton‘s high approval ratings helped House Democrats break the trend 
and gain seats during the 1998 midterm elections (Jacobson 1999).  Put simply, popular 
presidents can provide a boon to their parties‘ electoral fortunes, but an unpopular president can 
sink the election hopes of his party. 
Scholars have also investigated the impact of economic conditions on aggregate election 
outcomes with mixed results (Erickson 1990; Newman and Ostrom 2002).  This is probably due 
to the strong correlation between economic performance and presidential approval.  In 
Jacobson‘s (1999) discussion of the electoral impact of the Monica Lewinski scandal, he states 
that Bill Clinton‘s approval remained high because of strong economic performance, and voters 
cared more about Clinton‘s handling of the economy than they did about his zipper problem.     
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The number of seats in the House held by a party is also a strong predictor of the number 
of seats that a party gains or loses in the next election.  With more seats to defend, especially in 
districts in which the other party typically prevails, a party is overexposed.  Campbell (1986) 
includes the average number of seats held by the Democratic Party in the last two elections as a 
―base‖ variable.   As the base increases, the number of seats that the Democrats can pick up 
diminishes.  Marra and Ostrom (1989) refer to a historical average number of seats for each 
party.  Rising above this average means that more party members are at risk to lose reelection.  
Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman (1986) expand on this concept with the exposure thesis.  
The exposure thesis states that each party has an equilibrium number of seats, and when a party's 
number of seats deviates from the equilibrium, then the party will gain or lose seats in the next 
election to return to the equilibrium level.  Exposure is measured as actual number of seats less 
the long-term equilibrium level of seats (calculated as the average number of seats from the last 
few decades).  When the number of seats rises above the equilibrium, then the party should lose 
seats because the level of exposure is higher.  When the number of seats falls below the 
equilibrium, then the party should gain seats.  President Bill Clinton‘s reelection in 1996 came 
with very short coattails for House Democrats, so in 1998, the Democrats exposure rate was very 
low.  As a result, the Democrats were able to break the mold and gain seats during a midterm 
year (Jacobson 2001). President George Bush‘s coattails in 2000 were also very short, and as a 
result, House Republican exposure in 2002 was low.  House Republicans were also able to break 
the trend and gain seats during a midterm election year.  The chief problem with the exposure 
thesis is that calculating the equilibrium can become difficult.  Oppenheimer et al. calculated the 
average number of Democratic seats from 1954 (when the Democrats took control over the 
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House) to 1984.  Questions abound.  Now that majority control has flip flopped several times, 
from what Congress does one start in order to calculate the equilibrium?   Oppenheimer and his 
colleagues are unclear on this point, which makes the use of their method of exposure calculation 
in future research difficult.  
 A theory of surge and decline and a referendum theory of Congressional elections are 
compatible with one another.  Marra and Ostrom (1989) and Newman and Ostrom (2002) test 
combined models of seat change with variables for each model and find evidence for both 
theories.  Newman and Ostrom's model is fairly exhaustive in its inclusion of variables from the 
literature, but they warn of over-fitting.  Some of the variables included in their models are 
highly correlated with others, and they recommend excluding those particular variables when 
exploring seat change or aggregate election results.      
 
Where Does the Party Record Fit In? 
The components of the party record are aggregate level variables and could be included in a 
model of seat change. They tie each individual election contest to the reputation of the 
incumbent‘s (and possibly the challenger‘s) party.   As in studies of national tides, a party record 
model of elections predicts that one party will be favored over the other party and should gain 
seats as a result.  Also, as national tide or aggregate referendum models of elections suggest, 
Congressional elections are referenda on political parties.  Unlike national tide studies, the 
variables used in the analysis of a party record model of elections are generated directly by the 
party and its members.  The party record is something that can be manipulated to provide a 
benefit to party members.   The party record provides a means by which parties can influence 
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their own electoral fate. 
   
Party Record Models of Elections 
In chapters 2 and 3, several model variants were explored to determine which one model best 
explained the relationship between the party record and challenger entry and retirements.  
Models A-C describe the possible relationships between party records and election results in 
races where an incumbent faces a challenger in the general election while models D-F describe 
the possible relationships between party records and elections results in districts with open seats. 
 
Contested Seats 
Model Variant A: Incumbent Party Record only 
 In Model A, only the incumbent‘s party record influences general election results.  This is 
the traditional view of the party record in which only the incumbent‘s party influences election 
results.  Party leaders attempt to improve or safeguard the party record from damage in order to  
give their members an electoral benefit against potential challengers. In this model, voters cast 
their ballots based on the characteristics of the incumbent and his or her party.  They pay little 
attention to the challenger.  Just like the aggregate referendum models described above, voters 
make their decisions based on the past performance of those actors who are currently in office. 
 
Model Variant B: Challenger Party Record only 
 In Model B, only the challenger‘s party record influences general election results.  In 
contrast to Model A, party leaders attempt to improve or safeguard the party record in order to 
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provide a benefit for challengers.  The party record does not help incumbent party members, but 
it helps challengers against incumbents of the opposing party. 
  
Model Variant C: Both Incumbent and Challenger Party Records 
In Model C, both the incumbent and challenger‘s party records influence general election 
results.   Party leaders attempt to improve or safeguard the party record to provide an electoral 
benefit to their incumbent party members and challengers who share their party label. 
 
Model Variant D: No Impact 
In Model D, the party record has no significant effect on election results (this is a very 
real possibility considering the results from Chapter 3).  Party leaders may attempt to influence 
the party record, but ultimately, their efforts do not systematically affect election results.  There 
may be several reasons for a null finding.  A party record model of elections may assume a level 
of voter sophistication that is inaccurate.  On average, voters may not pay very much attention to 
the actions of the House of Representatives.  Perhaps, any reputation produced by a political 
party may only exist among elites.  While some have argued that voters take cues from elites 
regarding intricate political knowledge, it is possible that voters actually do not take cues from 
elites.  Another explanation is that elites may not provide cues to the less sophisticated electorate 
regarding the party record.   
Open Seats 
Open seats are treated differently than seats with an incumbent.  Neither candidate in an open 
seat race is a member of the House of Representatives.  It is, on average, easier for a challenging 
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party to win an open seat than one held by an incumbent.  Does the party record influence open 
seat election results? Or is the party record‘s effect on elections reserved for races which feature 
an incumbent?  Four model variants for open seat races are presented here. These models 
describe the impact of party record in open seat races only.  
 
Model Variant E: Traditional View of Party Record and Open Seats 
 In Model E, the party record has no impact on open seat election results. Under the 
traditional view of the party record, only incumbents receive an electoral benefit from the party 
record. Party leaders attempt to improve or safeguard the party record in order to provide a 
benefit for their incumbent party members.  Since neither candidate is an incumbent, neither 
candidate receives an electoral benefit from the party record.    
 
Model Variant E: Revised Model of Party Record and Open Seats 
 In Model F, there is no incumbent party record.  Both candidates‘ party records influence 
voters‘ decisions at the ballot box.  The party record may or may not aid incumbents or 
challengers in contested elections.  It does, however, provide an electoral benefit to candidates 
running for open seats.   
 This model does not yield predictions about the behavior of party leaders and the party 
record regarding challengers and incumbents.   In this model, party leaders, at least in part, 
improve or safeguard the party record in order to help candidates of their own party win in open 
seat races.  Winning open seat races improves the chances that the party will gain or maintain a 
majority of seats in the next Congress.  Moreover, by adding seats with members who are closer 
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to the party in ideological space, party members may improve their chances of rolling the other 
party (winning legislative battles). 
 
Variables 
Three dependent variables are analyzed.  Democratic Seat Change (DSC) is the change in the 
percent of House seats held by Democrats from one Congress to the next.  In other words, it is 
the change in the percentage of House seats won by the Democratic Party in each election.  
Contested Democratic Seat Change (CDSC) is the change in the percentage of contested seats 
won by Democrats in each election.   Contested seats refer to those seats where an incumbent 
faces a general election challenger.  Finally, Open Democratic Seat Percentage (ODSP) is the 
percentage of open seats won by Democrats each election.     
The party record variables are those that have been used in the past two chapters; 
however, the amendments made to these variables to account for the timing of challenger entry 
and retirement decisions are no longer needed.  Elections occur late in the second session of each 
Congress.  Democratic Negative Integrity Advantage (DNIA) is a count of the number of evening 
news stories on broadcast television stations, ABC, CBS, and NBC, attributable to each party‘s 
scandals for a given Congress.  DNIA should decrease the percentage of seats won in House 
elections.  Democratic Heterogeneity Advantage (DHA) is part of the ideological reputation of 
each political party.  It is the difference between the standard deviations of each party‘s first 
dimension DW-NOMINATE scores during a given Congress.  As DHA increases, the percentage 
of seats won in the House should decrease.  Polarization is the ideological distance using first 
dimension DW-NOMINATE scores between each party‘s median voters.  As Polarization 
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increases, the percentage of seats won in the House by Democrats should also increase.  
Democratic Party Win Rate is the percentage of votes won by the Democratic caucus in a given 
Congress. This measure is lagged by one Congress.  Finally, Lebo and O‘Geen (2011) find that it 
is not necessarily Democratic Party Win Rate that influences election results but support for the 
President (if he happens to share their party label).  I test models using Democratic President 
Win Rate, which is the percentage of the time that House Democrats vote with the President‘s 
position.   
National tide variables include Presidential Approval and Income.   Presidential Approval 
is measured as the last Gallup Poll taken before each election (usually this occurs during the last 
few weeks of October).  For Republican presidents, Presidential Approval is multiplied by -1.   
Income is measured as per capita income in each even numbered (election) year.  A dummy 
variable is included for Democratic Presidents.  This variable is expected to decrease Democratic 
Seat Change percentage.  Income is the natural log of per capita income in 2008 dollars as a 
measure of economic performance.   
There are two other variables included from the literature on seat change.  First, the 
President‘s party consistently loses seats each midterm election.  The dummy variable Midterm is 
interacted with the dummy variable for a Democratic President to create the variable Midterm 
Loss.  Midterm Loss should be negatively associated with Democratic Seat Change.   Also, I 
have included lagged dependent variables for Democratic Seat Change and Contested 
Democratic Seat Change.  I use the lagged dependent variable as a measure of exposure.  As the 
percentage of seats won in the previous election increases, the percentage of seats won in the 
current election decreases.  In contrast to the models of Democratic Seat Change and Contested 
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Democratic Seat Change, Open Democratic Seat Change does not include a lagged dependent 
variable.  Open seats cannot contain overexposed incumbents because they do not have 
incumbents, so there is no theoretical justification for including a lagged dependent variable in 
models of Open Democratic Seat Change.  
The inclusion of lagged dependent variables in these models warrants special attention.  
Lagged dependent variable (LDV) models can produce biased coefficients.  Kelly and Keele 
(2007) find that the bias is usually small and suggest LDV‘s should be included if there is a 
theoretical justification for their inclusion.  If LDV‘s are excluded when they should be included, 
the models, they argue, may contain omitted variable bias.     
 


































Figure 4.1 shows seat change from 1970-2008.  For 14 of the elections, Democrats won a 
majority of seats.  Democrats won their highest proportion of seats in 1974, the election 
immediately following Watergate. In 1994, Republicans won a majority of seats for the first time 
since the 1954 midterm election.  Republicans held on to the majority for the next five elections 
before Democrats took back the majority during the 2006 midterm election and increased the 
size of their majority in 2008.  
The results of OLS regression on Democratic Seat Change are shown in Table 4.1.  In 
Model I, the results show that some seat change variables and national tide variables are 
significant while party record variables do not attain significance.  The lagged dependent 
variable, which served as an exposure-like or base variable, was not significant.  The interaction 
term Midterm Loss was significant and in the expected direction. When House Democrats are up 
for reelection in a midterm election with a Democratic President, they can expect a 12.7 
percentage point decline in DSC.   Presidential Approval was significant and in the expected 
direction.  For each additional point in Presidential Approval, House Democrats can expect a 
0.31 percent point increase in DSC.  Results from the Breush-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test 
indicate that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation.   Results from the 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit performed on the residuals indicate that I can reject the null 
hypothesis that there is a unit root.  Also, the Shapiro-Wilk W test performed on the residuals 
indicates that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed.  An 
alternative model was also estimated without the LDV. It did not change the results of the model.  




I drop Democratic Win Rate and the LDV from the analysis (the exclusion of these variables 
does not affect the significance of the independent variables of interest).  Democratic President 
Win Rate fails to attain significance while both Midterm Loss and Presidential Approval both 
attain significance.  Conventional tests show that the residuals do not contain autocorrelation.   
While I do not report the results in the following tables, I also estimated models of Open 
Democratic Seat Rate and Contested Democratic Seat Change which include Democratic 
President Win Rate, but the variable fails to attain significance in each of those models as well.       
Table 4.2 shows the results of OLS regression on Contested Democratic Seat Change.  
No party record variables are significant in the model.  Presidential Approval, a national 
Table 4.1: OLS Regression of Democratic Seat Change, 1970-2008 
 
 Model I Model II 
DSCt-1 -0.2952  
 
(0.3089)  
Democratic President -0.3104* -0.2558 
 
(0.1243) (0.1152) 
Presidential Approval 0.0031* 0.0027* 
 
(0.0012) (0.0011) 
Δln(Income) 0.2035 0.1099 
 
(0.3107) (0.2826) 
Midterm Loss -0.1267* -0.1226* 
 
(0.0541) (0.0446) 
Midterm 0.0576 0.0713** 
 
(0.0298) (0.0199) 
ΔDemocratic Party Win Ratet-1 -0.0533  
 
(0.0611)  
ΔDemocratic President Win Rate t-1  0.00004 
  (0.0001) 
DHA -0.1788 -0.0425 
 
(0.6515) (0.5851) 
ΔPolarization 0.8012 0.5354 
 
(0.6592) (0.5061) 
DNIA 0.0000 -0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0002) 
Intercept 0.1564* 0.1252* 
 
(0.0537) (0.0451) 
N 20 20 
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.60 
Breusch-Godfrey LM χ2=1.304, p>0.253 χ2=1.265, p>0.261 
Durbin-Watson d 2.166 2.267 
   
             Note: p<0.05*, p<0.01** 
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tide variable, attains significance at the 0.05 level.  A one-percent increase in Presidential 
Approval increases the percentage of contested seats won by Democrats by 0.31 percent points.   
A Democratic President, however, decreases the percentage of contested seats won by Democrats 
by 33 percentage points.  The model was also estimated without the LDV, the exclusion of which 
did not change the results.   There is no evidence of autocorrelation or a unit root in the model.  
Results from the Shapiro-Wilk W test show that the residuals are normally distributed.   
Table 4.3 contains the results of OLS Regression on Open Democratic Seat Rate.  Once 
again, Presidential Approval is significant and in the expected direction.  For every additional 
percent point increase in Presidential Approval, ODSR increases by 0.96 percent points.  When 
there is a Democratic President during a midterm election, House Democrats‘ share of open seat 
Table 4.2: OLS Regression of Contested Democratic Seat Change, 1970-2008 
 
Contested Democratic Seat Changet-1 -0.2194 
 
(0.347) 






























Adjusted R2 0.382 
Breush-Godfrey LM χ2=2.111, p<0.146 
Durbin-Watson d 2.073 
  
    Note: p<0.05* 
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victories decreases by 47.06 percent points.   Unlike the previous models of election results, the 
model of open seats finds that one of the variables representing the ideological component of the 
party record is significant and in the expected direction, ΔPolarization.   The coefficient for 
ΔPolarization is not all that helpful for determining its impact on ODSR.  A one unit increase in 
the difference of polarization is unlikely to occur.  The largest change in ΔPolarization in the 
dataset is a decrease of 0.093.  An increase of 0.01 in the change of the ideological distance 
between the two median voters of each party increases the percentage of open seats won by 
House Democrats by 0.05 percentage points.  The results for standard tests for autocorrelation do 
not indicate a significant presence of autocorrelation, nor is there a unit root.  The residuals are 
normally distributed.  Taken together, the results of the models presented in this chapter show 
that, by and large, party 
Table 4.3: OLS Regression of Open Democratic Seat Rate, 1970-2008 
 
Democratic President    -0.6413 
 
0.3455 















ΔDemocratic Win Ratet-1   0.1235 
 
0.1563 
DHA      -0.647 
 
1.7129 
ΔPolarization   5.4008** 
 
1.482 




Adjusted R2 0.636 
Breusch-Godfrey LM χ2=2.016, p>0.156 
Durbin Watson d 2.35 
  




record variables, save Polarization, do not influence seat change.  One variable of the ideological 
component of the party record does attain significance and is signed in the expected direction.  
Polarization increases the percentage of the seats Democrats win in open seat elections.   
Intuitively, this result is not surprising.  Candidates for open seats often do not have a roll call 
record on national issues by which constituents may judge their future roll call actions.  When 
the parties are polarized, it is easier to discern the ideological position of each party in 
comparison to one another, and this may help voters making a ballot decision in open seat races 
to better determine how a candidate is likely to vote once he or she is actually in office.  
 Presidential Approval and the Midterm Loss do a much better job at predicting seat 
change in all types of races than the party record.   Given the lack of significance of party record 
variables, these results indicate that the effect of the party record may be too small to influence 
Congressional elections.  Only ideology seems to impact elections and even then only in open 
seat races.  
 
Conclusion 
 Party record variables seem to have little impact on seat change while Presidential 
Approval and Midterm Loss Attain significance.  Does this mean that the party record does not 
provide the type of collective electoral incentive envisioned by Cox and McCubbins?  The 
results here do not necessarily refute the existence of a party record.  In the next chapter, I 
provide possible explanations for why the results obtained in Chapter 4 do not match those found 
in previous literature on the party record.  I then discuss the results from Chapters 2-4 further, 
placing them in the broader context of the great party debate in the literature on Congress. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
In the preceding chapters, I analyzed the party record‘s impact on challenger entry, retirements, 
and election results.  Does the party record influence elections and election-related phenomena?  
The answer to this question based on the previous chapters is ―it depends.‖  In this concluding 
chapter, I first summarize the results of previous chapters.  Second, I describe what these results 
mean for the party record.  Third, I discuss possible explanations for why the results in the 
previous chapters differ from those obtained in other studies.  Fourth, I describe what these 
results mean for party government theories of Congressional organization.  Finally, I conclude 
with a discussion of responsible party government theory and collective responsibility.       
The analysis of challenger entry revealed that potential challengers are influenced by both 
the competence and integrity components of the party record.  The significant results show that 
chamber-generated party reputations have an influence on challenger entry.   Quality challengers, 
in contrast, are more likely to enter against incumbents when the President of their party enjoys 
higher levels of legislative support from his party in the House (a measure of competence that is 
generated by the behavior of more than just one chamber of Congress) but not integrity or 
ideology (at least not in the direction expected).   Quality challengers also respond to national 
tides (when Democratic President Win Rate is included in the model).  It is expected that 
potential quality challengers require larger increases in the probability of winning election to 
offset the higher cost of having to give up an already held elected position in order to run for the 
House.  The party record, on average, does not provide a large enough boost to the probability of 
winning reelection for these potential challengers.  
Democratic incumbents are not influenced by the components of the party record when 
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making career decisions, nor do they take into account national tide variables.  In fact, only a 
dummy variable for the 1992 election achieved statistical significance in the analysis of 
aggregate retirements.   National tide variables were also not statistically significant.  At the 
individual level, however, party leaders will seek to pressure their own party members to leave 
the House in order to reduce damage to the party record.   Pressure from party leaders is a 
significant cause of the retirement of House members accused of scandal.  Moreover, given the 
increased power of majority party leaders, they appear to enjoy an advantage when it comes to 
compelling an ethically-challenged party member to retire or resign from the House.   Does the 
strategy by party leaders actually reduce harm to the party record?  In a model of evening news 
stories, I find that those pressured to leave the House who actually do retire or resign generate 
fewer stories on the evening news.   It appears that this strategy by party leaders may, in fact, 
accomplish the ends for which it is employed, protecting the party record. 
 The competence and integrity components of the party record do not seem to influence 
election results.  The polarization variable, which is part of the ideological component of the 
party record, was significant in the examination of election results but only in open seat 
elections.   National tide variables were significant in all models of election results. 
 
Party Record Versus National Tides Revisited 
One of my key objectives was to draw a clear distinction between national tides and the party 
record. Based on the descriptions of each in previous research, I presented similarities and 
differences between these two concepts in Chapter 2.  Not all similarities and differences were 
examined in this work, but several key features were analyzed.   From the quantitative results 
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given in Chapters 2 through 4, several conclusions regarding the comparison between the party 
record and national tides may be drawn.  Table 5.1 is a revised version of Table 2.1 which 
includes the findings from the previous chapters as they relate to the differences and similarities 
between the party record and national tides given in Table 2.1.  As shown in Table 5.1, challenger 
entry decisions are influenced by both the party record and national tides.  This may occur 
because they influence the probability of winning reelection (although party record variables did 
not significantly affect aggregate election results in Chapter 4), but they do not have an impact 
on quality challenger entry decisions.   Neither influenced retirement decisions.  As stated 
previously, the value of a Congressional seat is just too high for most legislators to give it up 
without a fight.  
Table 5.1: Revised Table of Key Differences and Similarities Between National Tides and Party Records 
 
National Tides Party Record Revised Party Record Findings from Chapters 2-4 









Influence P in challenger entry 
calculus and retirement 
calculus 
Party Record Influences P in 
challenger entry (Ch. 2) but does not 
have a statistically significant 
impact on retirements (Ch. 3).  
National tides influence challenger 








Impact both challengers and 
Incumbents  (Woon and Pope 
2008) 
Both challenger and incumbent 
party records influence challenger 
entry (Ch. 2). 
Produced by 
actions of multiple 
institutions 
Produced by actions 
of party in one 
chamber of Congress 
 
Produced by actions of 
President and Congress, at 
least for competence (Lebo 
and O‘Geen 2011) 
Produced by House and 
Senate (Jones and McDermott 
2004) 
The integrity and ideological 
components of the party record are 
produced by one chamber of 
Congress (Ch.2 and 4).  The 
competence component is generated 
by the either the House or the House 
and President together (Ch. 2) 
Potentially affects 




elections for one 
chamber of Congress 
Primarily affects elections for 
one chamber of Congress. 
Affects elections for House 
and Senate (Jones and 
McDermott 2004). 
Only the ideological component 
influenced elections and only in 
open seat races (Ch. 4). National 
tide variables influenced elections in 
all models (Ch. 4).  




The party record, as originally formulated by Cox and McCubbins (1993), was thought to 
only influence incumbents and not challengers.   Woon and Pope (2008) disputed this assumption 
with their findings regarding the ideological component of the party record.  My results confirm 
the findings of Woon and Pope.  Each party record variable was operationalized in such a way 
that each variable was the advantage of one party over the other.  In this way, both the party 
record of the challenger‘s party and the incumbent‘s party influence an election-related 
phenomenon, challenger entry.    
The party record and national tides are produced by different actors. The party record is 
generated primarily by the actions of one chamber of Congress. The results in Chapter 2 confirm 
that, at least regarding integrity and ideology, the party record is an intra-chamber phenomenon.   
The reputation for competence is different.  In one model of aggregate challenger entry, winning 
legislative battles in the House was a significant predictor of challenger entry while in another 
model legislative support for the President was a significant predictor of quality challenger entry.  
Because competence was operationalized as a bill-passing measure, it makes sense that more 
than just one chamber of Congress may contribute to the generation of the competence 
component of the party record since multiple institutions are required to ultimately pass 
legislation.   With the results from Chapter 2, I conclude that the intra-chamber nature of the 
party record is dependent on the component under analysis; integrity and ideology fit the 
traditional mold of the party record while the competence component may or may not be 
generated by just one chamber of Congress 
Finally, the findings presented in Chapter 4 suggest that the competence and integrity 
components of the party record do not influence aggregate election results, while the ideological 
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component does influence results but only in open seat races.  I did not analyze the effect of 
party record components on election results for other branches of government or the Senate.  
Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this work.  I do not draw any conclusions about the 
impact of the party record or national tides on election results for elected officials outside of the 
House of Representatives. 
 
Previous Work on the Party Record 
My findings presented in this work differ from Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007), Lebo and 
O‘Geen (2011), and Woon and Pope (2008).  All three studies found that the party record 
influences election results.  There are several possible reasons why there are discrepancies 
between the work presented here and those presented in previous research.  First, the sample 
size, 20 time points, was smaller than that used in any of the previous research.  It is possible that 
more time points could have led to different results.  If I examined only the ideological 
component of the party record (DW-NOMINATE scores are available from the first Congress to 
the present Congress), I may have come up with different results.  If I examined only the 
competence component of the party record, Lebo and O‘Geen (2011) have data from 1958 to 
2006, adding four additional time points (after lagging by one Congress), I may have come up 
with different results.  Because data for the integrity component restricted the time period under 
study (the Vanderbilt Television News Archive only has news story abstracts since 1969), I could 
not extend the analysis further into the past than the 1970 election.  Some analyses of 
Congressional scandal, however, start from the 1968 election because during the 90
th
 Congress 
the House created the Ethics Committee, so in comparison to many works on scandal, the 
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analysis undertaken in these chapters only excludes scandals in one Congress.  
Second, the statistical models used in Chapter 4 are specified differently from those used 
by Lebo and O‘Geen (2011) or Woon and Pope (2008).   I included both national tide variables 
and three components of the party record in each model. This differs from models estimated in 
previous party record research because three components, instead of one, are included.  There are 
other specification differences as well.  Lebo and O‘Geen use Presidential Approval lagged by 
one Congress in their model of election results.  The use of Presidential Approval taken one 
Congress before the election is odd and against standard practice in the literature (Jacobson 
1989).  Since Presidential Approval can fluctuate greatly in the span of two years, it makes little 
sense to use a measure of Presidential Approval that is two years old.    
 
Parties in Congress 
Perhaps the biggest questions in the study of Congress over the last two decades concern the role 
of political parties in the organization of Congress. Do political parties matter for Congressional 
organization?  Do they influence policy outcomes? Are parties powerful? While the answers to 
these questions largely lie outside the scope of research conducted here, a discussion of the party 
record and the results from previous chapters are tangential to these topics.   In Chapter 1, the 
two major theories of party government described in Congressional research were discussed, 
cartel theory and conditional party government (CPG).  Under cartel theory, parties organize the 
House (or the Senate) in order to prevent legislation that is opposed by the majority party from 
passing the chamber; this is known as negative agenda setting (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007).  
Under CPG, party leaders and the tools of the party are strengthened when two conditions are 
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met—intraparty ideological homogeneity and interparty ideological heterogeneity.   These 
conditions are met when members of the same party have similar policy preferences but have 
very different policy preferences from those in the other party.  CPG is primarily a theory that 
describes positive agenda setting with party leaders using carrots and sticks provide incentives 
for party members to support the party‘s legislation on the floor of the House or Senate.   
Cox and McCubbins (1993) state that cartel theory could not exist in its current form if 
the party record did not also exist.  The party record provides an important electoral incentive for 
members of Congress to work together to solve collective action problems.   The evidence for the 
party record presented in the previous three chapters is mixed.  The three components of the 
party record influence elections and election-related phenomena in different ways. Competence 
and integrity affect aggregate challenger entry.  Party leaders take action to remove from the 
House those who may hurt the party‘s reputation for integrity.  Finally, the ideological 
component of the party record influences election results in open seat races.  It is clear that all 
three components have an effect on election-related phenomena, but only the ideological 
component directly impacts election results and even then only in open seat races.  The lack of 
statistical significance for party record variables in models of seat change is surprising and 
hampers the contention that the party record provides a collective electoral incentive, which 
fosters cooperation among party members.  
It is unclear if the party record, as conceptualized and operationalized in this dissertation, 
provides the type of electoral incentive for party member cooperation that Cox and McCubbins 
originally envisioned.   There are undoubtedly effects on election-related phenomena, but those 
effects are not very large, not large enough to influence aggregate retirements or seat change.  
129 
 
The electoral incentive produced by the party record provides a modest benefit for party 
members to work together.  It seems that the electoral benefit from national tides is larger and 
may provide an incentive to reach across institutions and work with other branches of 
government and chambers of Congress.      
In addition to the party government theories discussed here, there are two other major 
sets of theories which describe Congressional organization--distributive and informational 
theories (Shepsle and Weingast 1994).  In distributive theories, the House and Senate are 
organized to help members of each chamber increase gains from trade (logrolling) (Shepsle and 
Weingast 1994).  Each chamber utilizes a strategy of universalism whereby every member or 
almost every member of the House or Senate joins the winning coalition to receive benefits in 
the form of pork for each district.  The benefits (pork) do not necessarily need to exceed costs in 
the form of tax revenues extracted from the district.  Rather, benefits need only be concentrated 
to a member's reelection coalition (Weingast 1979).   
With Krehbiel‘s (1991) informational theory of organization, the House and Senate are 
organized in order to address the information deficits faced by MCs, so they may better engage 
in rational decision making.  The committee system allows MCs to specialize in different areas 
of public policies and become experts.  Other members of Congress who have similar policy 
preferences to one of these experts will rely on him or her for guidance regarding roll calls for 
the expert‘s policy area.  In effect, a legislative signaling game is played in which the expert 
signals to those with similar preferences how they should vote on a particular bill.  Krehbiel lists 
two postulates that constitute the foundation of his theory.  The majoritarian postulate states that 
―objects of legislative choice in both the procedural and policy domains must be chosen by a 
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majority of the legislature‖ (16).  The uncertainty postulate states that ―legislators are often 
uncertain about the relationship between policies and their outcomes‖ (20). Under the 
majoritarian postulate, the chamber median is the pivotal actor in the House. He is the principal 
actor involved in structuring the House (Shepsle and Weingast 1994).  It could be argued that the 
median legislator on an informative committee is the pivotal actor in the informational model 
because closed rules will leave the committee's bill largely intact.  The committee median, 
however, is largely reflective of the floor median, and the majoritarian postulate seems to 
indicate that the floor median is in fact the pivotal actor in the informational model.  Under the 
uncertainty postulate, information is required to aid legislators in making policy, and 
specialization allows them to help alleviate some of the uncertainty regarding legislation.        
The electoral implications of distributive theories are clear. By delivering policy benefits, 
which often include pork-barrel spending projects, members of Congress are bolstering their 
prospects for reelection.  In contrast to cartel theory and distributive theories, the electoral 
implications of Krehbiel‘s informational theory are not explicitly stated in his work.  Much of 
Krehbiel‘s research agenda is aimed at critiquing the two other major theories of Congressional 
organization (1987; 1993; 2007).   In particular, Krehbiel has criticized cartel theory in order to 
bolster the two non-partisan theories (the other is the pivotal politics model) he has advanced to 
explain Congressional organization and policy making (1991; 1998).  
Each of the two major alternative theories of Congressional organization assumes that 
political parties play a very small role in the organization of the House of Representatives and 
resulting policy outcomes.  If there is an electoral benefit produced for members of the House 
under these circumstances, it is likely bipartisan and should impact all incumbents running for 
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the House.  If this argument is advanced by non-party government theorists, there is strong 
support for a bipartisan election benefit.  Each election year, incumbents enjoy a very high 
reelection rate, and there is a voluminous literature on incumbency advantage (Ansolabehere, 
Snyder, and Stewart 2000; Fiorina 1977; King 1991; Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Mayhew 1974b; 
Prior 2006).  As stated in Chapter 3, most turnover in the House of Representatives is produced 
by retirements and resignations, not reelection loss.  It is possible that the actions of House 
members working within the institution may help contribute to this bipartisan electoral benefit; 
however, this bipartisan benefit would also exist side-by-side with the party record.  The results 
of the analysis conducted here, in conjunction with previous research on the party record, suggest 
that the party record influences election results and election related phenomena.  The results from 
analysis in the previous three chapters provide mixed support for the party record‘s impact on 
elections while results from others (Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007; Lebo and O‘Geen 2011; 
Woon and Pope 2008) provide clear support for a party record election effect.   Taken together, 
these findings suggest that the actions of parties and their members in the House do have an 
impact on election-related phenomena.  The impact produced by the party record provides a 
benefit to one party over the other.  It also provides an incentive for party members to work 
together to improve the record by minimizing scandal and winning legislative battles.  The 
benefit produced by the party record has profound effects on the American two-party system and 






Responsible Party Government 
Before discussing collective responsibility as it relates to political parties, I review the literature 
on responsible party government in order to put this notion of collective responsibility and the 
party record in a broader context, using APSA‘s Report from the Committee on Political Parties 
as a point of reference for this discussion.   
Political scientists have expressed mixed views on the impact of political parties on 
democracy.  Sloane (1912), for example, describes parties in the House and Senate as 
undemocratic, hindering deliberation in both the House and Senate.  His critique of political 
parties is especially strong for parties in the House, where he describes party leaders as autocratic 
with individual members rather helpless to stand up to the leadership for fear of retribution.    
In contrast to the views of Sloane, the report from the American Political Science 
Association‘s Committee on Political Parties (1950) prescribes a strengthening of political 
parties in order to increase political participation and better address the problems confronting the 
country.  The Report is one of the most oft read statements regarding political parties 
(Kirkpartick 1971; White 1992). The Report, which is really a call to action to reform the two-
party system, is a mix of normative and empirical elements.  It has been criticized for failing to 
explicitly draw distinctions between what is normative and what is empirical, for failing to fully 
flesh out the implications of its normative propositions, making incorrect observations about the 
party system for which it is suggesting the US emulate (Britain‘s), and making incorrect 
statements and assumptions about the origins and nature of the American party system 
(Kirkpatrick 1971; Ranney 1951).  Despite these criticisms, the Report is an important work in 
political science because it is so widely read, and it is important for the issues it raises regarding 
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democracy in the US.   
In short, the Report calls for strengthening the two-party system. Its recommendations 
include a greater role for political parties in the creation of policy proposals through the 
generation and adoption of party programs, which elected party officials should be bound to 
pursue; a greater variety of proposals from each party (in particular, the Report recommends 
distinct proposals from each party); greater coordination among state, local, and federal political 
parties as well as a balance of power between those parties that favors party organizations at the 
national level; increased power for majority parties in Congress (for example, requiring a simple 
majority vote for cloture in the Senate); increased coordination between members of the same 
party in the House, Senate, and presidency.  If its recommendations are followed, the Report 
claimed it would create more responsible parties.   
Collective responsibility through parties has received substantial attention from political 
scientists, often using the Report as a frame of reference. There are two types of responsibility 
referred to in the Report.  The first is responsibility of party leaders to party members through 
primaries, caucuses, etc.   The second type, and the type for which I am concerned with in this 
paper, is responsibility of each party to the general public through elections, especially for the 
policies they pass as well as for the implementation of those policies (22).  Pennock (1952, 707) 
offers a definition of responsibility that differs slightly from those found in the Report: ―A person 
is responsible to another for his actions when he can be held to account for them by another.  A 
government is responsible when its tenure of office is subject to control, within limits, by the 
electorate.‖  Pennock recognizes responsibility requires control by the electorate, but his 
description of responsibility throughout the rest of his work suggests that it is difficult to hold 
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parties responsible for particular policies due to the sheer number of important issues 
policymakers must confront.  It is unlikely that voters will agree with the entire program of a 
party.  Voters, however, only have two choices, and may end up supporting a party upon which 
they disagree with several policy positions. In such an instance, it is difficult to hold parties 
responsible.  While Pennock makes an excellent point, he fails adequately to take into account 
issue salience as a way in which voters and parties may be able to partially cope with this 
problem.  White (1992) suggests that the Report equates responsibility with accountability, and 
neither can occur unless parties formulate distinct policies and can pass those policies.  If this 
cannot occur, then ―elections become devoid of meaning‖ (White 1992, 11).  Fiorina (1980, 12) 
offers the following definition of responsibility:  
To say that some person or group is responsible for a state of affairs is to assert 
that he/they have the ability to take legitimate actions that have a major impact on 
that state of affairs. More colloquially, when someone is responsible we know 
whom to blame (12).   
Like Pennock (1952) and White (1992), Fiorina is concerned with second type of responsibility 
identified in the Report.  Also, like White, he seems to equate responsibility with accountability, 
evident by his statement ―we know whom to blame.‖   For policymaking in the US, Fiorina‘s 
definition or responsibility requires that an individual can only be held responsible to the extent 
that he or she can have a major impact on making policy.  Given the legislative process, it rarely 
occurs that an individual member of Congress could be held individually responsible, using 
Fiorina‘s definition.  Instead, collective responsibility is required.  Regarding collective 
responsibility, Fiorina states, ―[t]he only way collective responsibility has ever existed and can 
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exist, given American institutional arrangements, is through the agency of the political party‖ 
(13).   He goes on to describe collective responsibility through parties as having occurred 
through national tides in the past, but this has declined (13).  He also uses the term party record 
to describe the reputation of the party across institutions (national tides), which is different from 
Cox and McCubbins use of the term, which describes the reputation of a party in a single 
chamber of Congress.  
Achieving collective responsibility through the American two-party system is 
problematic.  First, separation of powers means that different parties may control different 
branches of government. It becomes much more difficult to hold one party responsible for the 
policies of government if it does not actually have the power to pass its program.  Second, 
candidate-centered elections for Congress and the incumbency advantage may also hinder 
collective responsibility through political parties.  People tend to dislike the institution of 
Congress but have high regard for their individual House member (Fenno 1975).  Despite 
scandals and other wrong-doing, Americans tend to reelect their incumbent MC year after year 
(Mann and Wolfinger 1980).  Achieving collective responsibility through political parties is 
difficult to imagine in a system in which voters tend to cast their ballots for the incumbent 
despite all his or her faults.  Collective responsibility through parties requires that at least some 
voters, some of the time, vote against their incumbent, based not on his or her actions and 
characteristics, but on those of his or her political party.  Voters hold the group, the collective, 
responsible for its actions in government.  It may be that perceptions of dishonesty or scandal on 
the part of a political party have little or nothing to do with their incumbent member of Congress, 
and yet, he or she is still tied to the Democratic or Republican Party through the concomitant 
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reputation of that party   
Fiorina notes that there is a decline in collective responsibility because parties as 
organizations, parties in the electorate, and parties in government have declined, which suggests 
that the two-party system has moved away from the party ideal presented in the Report.  Since 
the publication of the Report, however, political parties have strengthened, and in several areas, 
have come closer to meeting the goals of the Committee on Political Parties (Epstein 2002; 
Pomper 1971; White 1992).  Party identification from the 1960s through the 1980s waned 
(Abramson 1976; Fiorina 1980); however, this trend began to change course in the 1990s, as 
more people again began to identify with one of the two major political parties (Bartels 2000).  
Also, party identification is still the primary determinant of vote choice (Abramson, Aldrich and 
Rohde 2007; Bartels 2000; Campbell et al. 1960).  Parties in Congress have more homogenous 
memberships and are further away from each other ideologically than at the middle of the 
twentieth-century (Han and Brady 2007; Rohde 1991).  Moreover, rule changes in the House 
have strengthened majority party leadership and increased the positive agenda setting ability of 
the majority (Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Binder 1996; Owens 1997; Rohde 1974; 1991), helping 
party leaders to pass legislation favored by their members (Bianco and Sened 2005).  Finally, 
party organizations have continued to reach voters, attempting to increase turnout among party 
members and increase electoral participation, even in the absence of big city machine politics 
(Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Wielhouwer and Lockbie 1994). 
Cox and McCubbins (2005, chapter 1) redefine responsible parties to incorporate their 
theory of negative agenda setting.  The traditional view of responsible parties as envisioned in 
the Report and by Ranney (1954) holds that parties propose and pass distinct policies when they 
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are in control of government.  This requires ideologically cohesive parties whose leaders exert 
enough influence to enforce party discipline and corral enough votes for the passage of policy 
proposals.   While they believe that this may be a part of responsible parties, there is more to the 
story.  Cox and McCubbins assert that responsible parties keep legislation unwanted by a 
majority of the majority party from passing the House.   Their reconceptualization of party 
responsibility does not explicitly discuss responsibility as accountability through elections, 
which is my aim here.   
Because of the separation of powers written into the Constitution, it is difficult to achieve 
a British-style party system where it is easy to hold all members of a political party responsible 
for the state of the country.   Jones (2002) describes the American party system as a ―government 
of parties‖ rather than as party government.  It is because the American system is so fragmented 
due to federalism and separation of powers that more than one type of collective responsibility 
must exist to ensure that there is cooperation within these separate parties as well as 
collaboration across parties to pass legislation.   This argument is also made by Jones and 
McDermott (2004) in their analysis of responsible party government in House and Senate 
elections.  They find that there appear to be two different forms of party responsibility, one which 
occurs across branches of government and another that occurs within each branch government.    
 Coalitional collective responsibility refers to holding those who are part of a ruling 
coalition accountable for their conduct while they are in power.  A coalition of actors from 
different branches of government is necessary to pass legislation and address public problems.   
National tides are a mechanism through which voters can hold members of a political party 
responsible for their actions.  The impact of national tides is broad; party members from the 
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presidency to the House to the Senate and even state and local levels may win or lose elections 
based on coalitional collective responsibility.  Coalition collective responsibility provides an 
incentive for actors of the same party in different institutions in government to work together to 
pursue policies that address public problems for which constituents demand action.  Fiorina 
(1980) recognized this type of collective responsibility in his seminal article; however, he did not 
recognize the second type of collective responsibility.    
 Institutional collective responsibility is more precise vis-à-vis coalitional collective 
responsibility.  The party record is the mechanism through which voters may hold House (or 
Senate) Democrats or Republicans accountable for their actions.  While national tides and the 
achievement of coalitional collective responsibility are approximate (party members across 
institutions are held to account), party records and the achievement of institutional collective 
responsibility is more precise because the party members of one institution are not penalized and 
do not benefit from the actions of members of a political party that are located outside of that 
institution.  Put another way, with institutional collective responsibility, members of a political 
party in a single institution determine their own electoral fate through the actions and the 
reputation that those actions generate.  The party record, then, provides an electoral incentive for 
party members within an institution to cooperate with one another to pass legislation and prevent 
scandal.   
The results from the preceding chapters show that both types of collective responsibility 
are at work simultaneously.   Members of the House are held collectively responsible through 
both national tides and the party record, with each concept corresponding to a different form of 
collective responsibility.  National tides and the party record provide electoral incentives for 
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members of the same political party to cooperate within an institution (the party record) and 
across institutions (national tides).  These electoral incentives provide motivation for party 
members, both within and across institutions, to work together to pass legislation that addresses 
important public policy problems; work to prevent, or at a minimum, reduce the fallout from 
political scandal; and provide clear ideological signals to voters about the types of policies each 
party would pursue if they gained control of government.  The two types of collective 
responsibility that I described in the preceding paragraphs differ from those identified by Jones 
and McDermott (2004).  Because Congress can be divided, it is also difficult to ensure collective 
responsibility with each party controlling one chamber of Congress.  It is, therefore, necessary to 
seek an intra-chamber approach to institutional collective responsibility.    
 In response to Fiorina‘s (1980) lamentation that there has been a decline in collective 
responsibility in American politics,  the results of the preceding chapters find support for two 
types of collective responsibility for the 38 year period under study.   
Not mentioned in the responsible party government literature or by Fiorina (1980) is a 
description of how parties may be held accountable for their reputations for integrity, or put 
another way, for the scandals of their members.  The Report and Fiorina were primarily 
concerned with collective responsibility in the context of public policy, not scandal.  The 
findings here suggest that it is primarily through the party record and its impact on challenger 
entry that collective responsibility for unethical behavior in Congress occurs; however, when 
scandal occurs in the executive branch, members of the President‘s party in Congress may be 
held responsible in addition to the President as results from the 1974 midterm election suggest.    
 In short, Fiorina is mistaken about a decline of collective responsibility in American 
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politics.  Approximately twenty years after penning his seminal article about the decline of 
parties and responsibility, Fiorina reviewed the changes in American party politics and still 
maintained that there is a decline in political parties.  With the evidence presented here, I 
disagree with Fiorina‘s assertion.  While the American party system may not be as responsible as 
the members of the Committee on Political Parties may have hoped it would become when they 
wrote the Report, parties, at least in Congress, have moved closer to their ideal, not further.  The 
party record and national tides are two important parts of an American responsible party system.  
National tides allow voters to hold party members across institutions accountable for their 
actions.  The party record allows voters to hold party members accountable within an institution.  
In a system of government in which separation of powers is a defining characteristic, the party 
record allows voters to hold officeholders of the same party accountable, even during periods of 
divided government.  These two very different parts of collective responsibility in American 
government are vital elements of our democracy, allowing voters to hold their elected officials 
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